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This thesis contains three chapters. The first two consider deviations from rational
expectations for understanding the unprecedentedly long period of a binding zero
lower bound (ZLB) since the Great Recession. There I show that if agents are adap-
tively learning, Central Banks can use forward guidance to guide them through the
novel economic environment. In the third chapter I take a more long-run struc-
tural outlook to study the interplay of skills, technologies and complementarities for
understanding differences in labour market outcomes across OECD countries.
The first chapter studies the effects of forward guidance (FG) from a novel per-
spective. Instead of considering FG as a promise for future actions or providing
better forecasting, the Central Bank (CB) in the model is giving a signal about
its own reaction function. The CB uses FG as a communication device to signal
a policy change. The main findings are that clear communication increases welfare
compared to no communication, yet vague messages prove ineffective.
The second chapter considers the ZLB as an informational curtain for adaptively
learning agents as they cannot observe the path of the interest rate. In a model I
show that this results in expectations disagreement between the agents and the CB,
consistent with the data. The disagreement coupled with the learning of the agents
results in explosive dynamics. Forward guidance is shown to restore stability at the
ZLB by preventing spurious expectational drift.
The third chapter studies the relationship between returns to skill and assortative
matching. Using the PIAAC cognitive skills dataset I show that: returns to skill
are systematically related to industrial sorting; high-skilled industries have more
assortative matching of workers from all occupations; and more developed countries
have less mismatch. I further build a model to illuminate the mechanism. I find
that rich countries experience a trade-off of lower overall mismatch but higher cross-
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Policy Change and Forward Guid-
ance
”By setting out how it is likely to set policy in the future, the MPC can help individ-
uals understand how it intends to trade off the speed with which it returns inflation
to the target against the scope for economic expansion. In addition, by explaining
the reasons underlying that view, the MPC can also help individuals understand how
it is likely to change policy in response to unanticipated developments as and when
they occur.”
Bank of England (2013)
1.1 Introduction
The onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 brought the policy rates of even-
tually all major Central Banks (CBs) to their effective lower bounds. With their
primary policy instrument pinned at a sub-optimal level for the immediate future,
CBs resolved to alternative measures in hope of mitigating the downturn of the cri-
sis and contributing to a faster recovery. Among other things, Central Banks began
providing information for the future path of the policy rate - a rarity in the past.
Such announcements constitute what is called ”Forward Guidance” and this paper
proposes a novel approach to its analysis.
The literature on Forward Guidance (FG) largely agrees that the main channel
of influence of FG is the information conveyed for the future path of the policy rate.
There are two main classifications of FG depending on the underlying reasons for
its use. The seminal work of Krugman et al. (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) showed that promises of lower interest rates for longer can largely mitigate the
1
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negative effects of a binding zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates. The stimulus
comes through agents expecting low interest rates in the future (i.e. accommodative
monetary policy) and higher inflation, hence cutting back less on present investment
and consumption. Campbell et al. (2012) label this approach Odyssean Forward
Guidance. Campbell et al. (2012) also acknowledge a more established form of FG,
pursued by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Riksbank in Sweden, for
example. In essence, CBs engage in regular forecasts of the path of their policy rate,
hence it was dubbed Delphic Forward Guidance. This type of FG may be useful to
the public if the CB has better information about the state of the shocks that hit
the economy.
This paper, however, considers the possibility that a Central Bank uses Forward
Guidance not as a promise for future actions (Odyssean) or providing better fore-
casting facilities (Delphic), rather the CB is giving a signal about its own reaction
function. In particular, under the ZLB if agents are unaware of a policy regime
change which prolongs the ZLB, or for some reason misjudge the CB’s reaction
function and bias their expectations, the CB can use the expected conditions (e.g.
date or thresholds) for a lift-off of the policy rate from the ZLB as a guiding tool
for agents to correct their beliefs.
Indeed, statements from Central Bank officials in the recent years suggest that
there is a discrepancy between the beliefs of the private sector and the CB. Yellen
(2012) claims that in the last decades the policy of the Federal Reserve has become
predictable to the private agents. However she continues, the recent crisis made
it harder for agents to foresee policy. Bank of England (2013) clarifies that FG
announcements aim to convey to the public the relative trade-off between output
gap and inflation stabilization that the CB is considering. Although Delphic FG does
increase the transparency of the monetary policy function, Walsh (2014) argues that
in normal times when a CB has for a long time acted in a systematic manner, such
forecasts have low if any informational content. Moreover, Faust and Wright (2009)
find no convincing evidence of any forecasting advantage of CB over private agents.
Cœuré (2013) and Fed(2011), on the other hand, reject the idea of Odyssean FG
on the grounds that the CB would not like to commit itself in a time-inconsistent
2
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manner. Also, Faust (2015) finds no overshooting relative to target in the Federal
Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) inflation forecasts, which is assumed to occur
with Odyssean FG as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
To tackle the view that under a binding ZLB agents cannot observe a policy
change this paper drops the ubiquitous assumption of rational expectations (RE)
and models agents as adaptive learners. The literature on adaptive learning in
macroeconomics has shown that is a plausible framework of analysing agents be-
haviour. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) develop the theory and criteria for adaptive
learners’ convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium. Milani (2007) shows
that an economy with adaptive learners is better able to match macroeconomic data
persistence than RE models are. Finally, for a survey of experimental support for
adaptive learning as a paradigm refer to Duffy (2014).
This approach allows for modelling imperfect knowledge of the CB’s reaction
function. Assuming that it is too costly, implausible or too restrictive that a CB can
communicate its entire policy rule, FG can be used as a simple signal for a policy
change. The mechanism builds on the lack of real-time observations under ZLB that
adaptive learners could use for learning the new policy function. Under the ZLB and
after a policy change1 announcements of the anticipated date of departure from ZLB
could potentially help the learning agents update their perceived policy function,
thus making less sub-optimal decisions2. This mechanism is absent in RE models
where agents know the true reaction function by construction. Thus, this paper
strives to analyse Forward Guidance at the zero lower bound as a communication
technology for the Central Bank after a policy change. It then asks the questions:
Should the Central Bank try communicate its changed reaction function to the public?
What are the benefits and dangers of doing so?
The main results are that communication does increase welfare, yet an ambiguous
message may be largely inefficient. The modelling framework also captures realistic
heterogeneous beliefs about the Central Bank’s reaction function.
1After all, the ZLB is usually hit only in extreme circumstances which may well warrant a change
in the policy reaction function.
2Naturally, a full internalization of the new policy function would lead to optimal results as later
shown.
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These results are supported by the evidence Engen et al. (2015) gather on private
agents’ expectations in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators data. First, they show
that before switching to date- and state-based forward guidance in September 2011
the Federal Reserve’s prior open-ended forward guidance did little to move market
expectations. Later explicit announcements had a much more pronounced effect in
shifting expectations of the interest rate, inflation and consumption paths. Second,
they estimate private agents’ perceived Taylor rule and find that during the ZLB
their expectations imply a much higher reaction to economic slack in the FED’s
policy function. This is precisely the experiment I consider here.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the related literature. Sec-
tion 3.4 describes the model of the economy. Section 1.4 explains the expectations
formation of the agents. Section 1.5 outlines the studied experiments. Section 1.6
presents the main results of the study, while Section 1.7 performs some robustness
checks. Section 1.8 shows that the model can replicate some heterogeneous expec-
tations found in the data. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
The literature on Forward Guidance largely agrees that the main channel of influence
of FG is the information conveyed for the future path of the policy rate. Moreover,
Woodford (2012) argues that the predominant effects of the LSAP programmes in
the United States were actually achieved through the implicit signalling of the future
path of interest rates contained in the announcements. In influential empirical work
on the effectiveness of quantitative policies (QE) in the US Gagnon et al. (2011),
Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) find
that at least 30-50% of the announcement effects of QE by the FOMC can be ac-
counted to expectations about the federal funds rate (FFR) future path. Overall,
Woodford (2012)’s suggestion is to signal information about future interest rates
with a clear target as to preserve credibility and ensure that the policy is properly
understood. This prescription is reminiscent of the seminal work of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) who show that in a canonical New Keynesian (NK) model the
4
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optimal policy in the face of binding zero lower bound is a ”output-gap-weighted
price level targeting”. The essence of their result is the backward-looking nature of a
price level targeting regime (contrary to inflation targeting regime). Then, commit-
ment to such a policy ensures that in the future the economy will be compensated
by lax monetary stance in order to make up for the inefficiency of the period un-
der ZLB and for the price level to be brought back on target. They show that
this policy is very effective at stabilizing the output gap and inflation at relatively
mild costs of elevated inflation in the subsequent periods. Nonetheless, Levin et al.
(2009) argue that although FG can be an effective tool against moderate natural
rate shocks - ”Great Moderation”-type of shock, it falls short of coping alone with
”Great Recession”-style shocks. Levine et al. show that the large effects of FG in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) are due to their parametrization of preferences and
a two-state Markov process shock, and that more realistic values and shock processes
significantly dampen the effectiveness of FG. They conclude that additional policy
actions are need in times of severe crisis.
The aforementioned channel of FG has been dubbed Odyssian Forward Guid-
ance by Campbell et al. (2012) in that it contains an (assumed) credible promise for
keeping interest rates lower than the standard policy reaction function would imply
in the initial stages of recovery. The literature analysing Odyssian FG relies heavily
on rational agents who perfectly understand the economy’s model. Moreover, such
a policy is only credible with backward-looking monetary policy (MP) rules and not
with the predominant forward-looking inflation targeting regimes of central banks,
thus rendering it time-inconsistent. In fact, Del Negro et al. (2012) employ a speci-
fication for the interest rate rule of a CB in a NK model with rational expectations
(RE) that features anticipated future monetary policy shocks as forward guidance:






where π stands for inflation, x for the output gap, εMP for random monetary policy
disturbances and εFGl,t−1 for FG news shocks realized at period t− l and regarding the
interest rate rule at period t, i.e. Forward Guidance of l periods ahead. Del Negro
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et al. find an unexpectedly large positive effect of Forward Guidance when estimated
on the US economy and label this result ”the forward guidance puzzle”. Yet, this
approach may be questioned on two important grounds. First, assuming that under
RE: EtεFGl,t+L−l = 0, ∀ L > l ≥ 1, i.e. agents never expect Forward Guidance to
occur, and hence the CB can arbitrarily use these FG shocks to stimulate current
demand. Second, Harrison (2014) shows that in RE NK models employing the
former rule FG shocks would need to be too large in order to match the findings of
Del Negro et al. (2012). In particular, Harrison (2014) shows that if agents judge
policy shocks based on old experience with a statistical confidence level of 5%, they
would judge that the FG shocks of Del Negro et al. (2012) are not a modest policy
intervention, but rather a regime shift. His analysis resembles an empirical measure
for assessing the Lucas’ critique.
To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few papers that consider modelling
Forward Guidance in an environment with deviations from the rational expectations
hypothesis. Cole (2015) incorporates Del Negro et al. (2012)’s policy rule specifi-
cation in a baseline NK model with agents who are adaptive learners. Overall,
he concludes that FG is less effective under adaptive learning than under RE and
that Central Banks should be wary of employing it if their internal models feature
rational agents.
In another application of adaptive learning Mitra and Honkapohja (2015) con-
sider Forward Guidance in the sense of incorporating the particular targets of price-
level or nominal GDP targeting in agents’ perceived laws of motion (PLMs) and
show that these regimes perform better than an inflation targeting (IT) without FG.
They find that without FG in any of the regimes it is not clear which of the three
policies performs better. Mitra and Honkapohja (2015) use a deterministic model
where the shocks are the initial conditions for the adaptive learners. Therefore, they
resort to steady state (SS) learning instead of the standard recursive least squares
(RLS) used in the literature. This, however, implies that agents do not have a model
of the policy rule followed by the CB, but update their expectations of the gross




t−1 +ω(Rt−1−Ret−1), where the superscript
e stands for ’expected’ and ω is a learning gain parameter. This updating rule im-
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plies that once the economy is at the ZLB, i.e. Ret−1 = Rt−1 = 1, agents will always
expect that next period the ZLB is again binding - Rt = 1. These naive expectations
implicitly suggest that agents never understand what the ZLB means and do not
project its end - they simply wait for observations one period at a time. Section
1.4 outlines how this problem is solved here with agents forming expectations of the
ZLB duration at every period.
The literature until now has focused on the very important convergence proper-
ties of learning models, while here I consider the merit of FG along the transition
path during a binding ZLB. Evans and McGough (2018) show that a constant in-
terest rate peg in New Keynesian models violates the Taylor principle and results
in explosive learning dynamics. The temporary nature of the ZLB here, however, is
not subject to such instability.
1.3 Model
The model environment in this paper is the canonical New Keynesian model with
Rotemberg price-setting mechanism as in Eusepi and Preston (2010) and its micro-
foundations are presented in the online appendix. The aggregate dynamics of the
model, derived from the optimal decisions of households and firms, can be summa-












T−t [(1− γ1β) (xT + µT ) + πT ] (1.2)
where xt is the output gap, πt the inflation rate, it the nominal interest rate. The
expectation operator Êt stands for the potentially non-rational expectations of the
agents and, henceforth, Et denotes rational expectations; ret and µt are the exogenous
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where 0 < ρr, ρµ < 1 and ε
r
t ∼ N(0, σr), ε
µ
t ∼ N(0, σµ) are independently and
identically distributed random variables. The discount factor 0 < β < 1, while
ξ > 0 is a measure of price stickiness with ξ → ∞ implying convergence to ar-
bitrarily small costs of price adjustment (i.e. approaching fully flexible prices);
and 0 < γ1 is an eigenvalue from the underlying microfoundations, where in a
Calvo price adjustment it would represent the probability of not resetting the price.
The parameter values are shown in Table 1.A.1 in the appendix. All variables are
expressed as log-deviations from their steady state values. Thus, in steady state
x = π = i = re = µ = 0.
The model is closed with a monetary authority setting the nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound.
it = max
{
i∗, χπÊt−1πt + χxÊt−1xt
}
(1.3)
where the policy parameters satisfy χπ > 1 and χx > 0. The constant i
∗ = 1−1/β <
0 represents the effective lower bound on interest rates since, otherwise, as explained
in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) agents would choose to hold all their assets in
cash. I will refer to it as the ZLB to be consistent with the arguments in the
Introduction and with real world analogies.
A Taylor rule is assumed here as it has been shown to describe well the historical
policy rate path of Central Banks. Nevertheless, its specification is subject to many
disputes especially in such novel and uncertain times. Thus, the adoption of a rule
instead of optimal policy in the model allows for changes in the reaction function of
the Central Bank, which if not fully transparent, may be wrongly perceived by the
public and result in unfavourable aggregate outcomes.
Finally, notice that all agents form decisions in period t based on t− 1 informa-
tion. Eusepi and Preston (2010) argue that this representation is plausible in view of
the difficulty for CBs of obtaining accurate real-time data. It is also consistent, they
claim, with the VAR evidence from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) on spending
and pricing decisions after a MP shock. Additionally, the rule here assumes that
agents and the Central Bank have identical forecasting facilities. This implies that
8
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the CB does not have an informational advantage about the state of the world com-
pared to the public and the only private information it possesses is the specification
of its reaction function.
1.4 Expectations
1.4.1 Expectations formation
Studying the effects of changes in policy parameters requires that agents are not
fully rational as otherwise they would simply incorporate the new policy parameters
in their (correct) model of the economy. In a rational expectations environment
expectations are anchored by construction and no role exists for Forward Guidance
in clarifying the CB policy function. To allow for a degree of bounded rationality
I assume that agents form expectations through adaptive learning (ADL). In par-
ticular, they do not know the true structure of the economy and make forecasts
as econometricians using simple regression models3. Namely, they make forecasts
according to the aggregate policy functions from the minimum state-variable RE
solution to the model: xt (r
e
t , µt) and πt (r
e
t , µt). Each period, as additional data
becomes available, agents update the coefficients to their forecasting model. They
are assumed to observe the disturbances ret and µt and to know their autoregressive
coefficients 4.
In the benchmark case of no policy change and no Forward Guidance the agents
















 is a transition
matrix that defines the PLM, finally et are iid estimation errors.
3Following the ’consistency principle’ of Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
4Eusepi and Preston (2010) show that this assumption can be dispensed with and instead agents
would estimate those coefficients. For simplicity, it is maintained.
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Eusepi and Preston (2010) show that for determinacy and convergence to the
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) it is sufficient that agents understand only
the functional form of the Taylor-type monetary policy rule (1.3). Here it is exactly
assumed that agents know that it(xt, πt) is a linear function and update its coeffi-
cients as new data becomes available. The expected interest rate - iet , is obtained
as:
iet = [ψx,t−1 ψπ,t−1]
 xet
πet
 = ψ′t−1Y et (1.5)
To extend the mechanic adaptive learning framework described above every, pe-
riod t agents are assumed to form long run expectations about Êt−1xT , Êt−1πT , Êt−1iT
for any T ≥ t by iterating forward their PLMs (1.4) and (1.5). This gives them a
perceived trajectory for the future of all endogenous variables. In this way in a
recession with binding ZLB the agents can compute the date T zlb when they ex-
pect the interest rate to be constraint for the last time, i.e. Êt−1iT zlb ≤ i∗ and




∗ and Êt−1iT zlb+s > i∗ for s ≥ 1, thus affecting the aggregate
behaviour of the economy.
At any date the CB also performs similar projections of the interest rate path
into the future and obtains its own estimate of the last period of binding ZLB -
TCB, by using the true Taylor rule (1.3). It then communicates this to the agents
and if T zlb 6= TCB, they update their perceived Taylor rule coefficients (ψx and ψπ)
at the end of the particular date t so that the two estimates of the terminal ZLB
date coincide - T zlb = TCB. Therefore, the CB’s announcements are regular and
perceived as credible clarifications on its reaction function. Hence, communication
is truthful, time-consistent and non-strategic similar to the practice of some infla-
tion targeting central banks (i.e. Sveriges Riksbank and the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand) and the statements from the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve
from the introduction. This communication and adjustment process constitutes the
nature of Forward Guidance in the paper. The next section provides the details
about the policy change experiment and different scenarios of how agents interpret
10
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FG.
The timing of expectation formation is as follows:
1. At the beginning of period t agents use information until period t − 1, their
current beliefs about the aggregate PLM (1.4) and the PLM for the interest
rate (1.5) to form expectations of the endogenous variables xT , πT and iT :





, ∀T > t− 1 (1.7)




Et−1iT = i∗ for T ≤ T zlb
Et−1iT > i∗ for T > T zlb
(1.8)
The Central Bank similarly obtains its estimate TCB.
2. Based on their expectations Êt−1YT , Êt−1iT and Êt−1T zlb the agents make
their decisions. These in turn feed into the aggregate demand equation (1.1),
the New Keynesian Phillips curve (1.2) and the actual Taylor rule (1.3) giving
rise to the actual law of motion of the economy (ALM) - Yt and it.
3. At the end of period t agents observe the realisations of Yt and it and up-
date their transition matrices Φt according to the a recursive constant gain
algorithm for the aggregate PLM:
























and ψt for the Taylor rule PLM:
(a) In the case of no binding ZLB, they update their perceived Taylor rule
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by:
























where Rt and Qt are variance-covariance matrices used for weighting the
deviations of the estimated parameters; τ is the gain parameter weight
for new information.
(b) In the case of no Forward Guidance under ZLB, agents do not change
their estimates, but only keep updating the variance-covariance matrix
Qt as new data arrives:
ψx,t =ψx,t−1 (1.17)
ψπ,t =ψπ,t−1 (1.18)










(c) In the case of Forward Guidance under the ZLB, agents update their per-
ceived Taylor coefficients so that T zlb = TCB. In particular they change
linearly either ψx or ψπ, or update both as described in (1.13)-(1.16) but
with weight λ ≥ τ , which captures the credibility of the CB’s announce-
ment and the higher importance that it brings relative to another data
point.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that in the case of a decreasing gain learning -
τ = 1/t, the learning algorithm converges asymptotically to the least squares (LS)
estimate and the REE. Under constant gain learning - τ a small constant, instead,
the algorithm converges to a distribution centred around the REE. The constant
weight given to new information across time in the latter allows agents to more
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easily learn about structural changes in the economy. Given the emphasis here
on tracking policy change over smoothing, a constant gain parameter τ = 0.02 is
employed which is showed to match US data well by Milani (2007) and Eusepi and
Preston (2018).
Note that the system does need at least two exogenous processes driving the fun-
damentals (x and π), since otherwise output gap and inflation will be linear functions
of the single shock and the agents will not be able to distinguish between and learn
the two Taylor coefficients - ψx and ψπ. Therefore, for the initial convergence to
REE I keep both shocks active, yet for the policy experiment only the natural rate
shock is active and causes a recession.
1.4.2 Infinite horizon
If agents were rational, the infinite sums in (1.1) and (1.2) would obey the law of
iterated expectations (LIE) and can therefore be recursively represented by:
xt = Et−1xt+1 − Et−1 (it − πt+1 − ret ) (1.21)
πt = ξEt−1xt + βEt−1πt+1 + Et−1µt (1.22)
Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010) claim that because households and
firms only know their own objectives, constraints and beliefs they cannot compute
aggregate probability laws. As a result, Êt does not satisfy LIE and an infinite
planning horizon as in (1.1) and (1.2) is required. Yet, Honkapohja et al. (2012)
point out that assuming a continuum of symmetrical agents as is the case in the
used NK model, one could still apply the LIE and resort to one period ahead Eurler
equation learning.
I keep the infinite horizon learning for two reasons. First, it allows for incor-
poration of Forward Guidance into the law of motion for the aggregate variables,
contrary to the one step-ahead behavioural Euler equation learning approach5. Sec-
ond, because agents do not know the structure of the economy, they cannot foresee
how the ZLB will change the ALM. This is a realistic assumption, yet taken alone it
5See Honkapohja et al. (2012) on the specifics of the Euler equation approach.
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has the unpleasant implication that agents are oblivious of the ZLB if they simply
iterate forward their PLM (1.4). Therefore, as discussed I assume that in their indi-
vidual decisions agents at least account for the expected duration of the ZLB which
affects immediately the realization of xt and πt, but they only gradually learn how
the ZLB changes the aggregate ALM - the actual Φ transition matrix, and update
their aggregate forecasts. This discontinuity in the perceived path of the nominal
interest rate requires a long horizon learning approach since a recursive formulation
would not capture the anticipated end of the ZLB.
1.5 Policy change and information structures
This section presents different scenarios of policy regimes and information possessed
by the private sector regarding the current policy regime. The simulations study
the effects of a 5% drop from the SS value of re at t = 1 that ex-ante brings the
interest rate under ZLB for 7-8 periods. The experiments consider an increase in
the reaction to the output gap χx from 0.1667 to 1 at t = 2. This is in line with the
initial discussion that Central Banks wanted to communicate a changed trade-off
between inflation and output gap, and the findings of Engen et al. (2015) who show
that the perceived Taylor rule of private agents gradually shifted towards one with a
much higher weight on output gap stabilization. The policy experiment considered
is chosen to prolong the period of binding ZLB and reflect the suggestions of Central
Banks that clarification regarding their reaction function is need. In particular, it is
important to convey that the new reaction function weighs output gap and inflation
stabilization differently from before.
The exploited mechanism here is that agents need data points to track policy
changes. Then under the ZLB when the interest rate is inelastic and no new mon-
etary policy data is available, Forward Guidance could potentially provide them
with another anchor - the date of the last expected period of ZLB, so that they
can update their estimates of ψx and ψπ. Next, different communication strategies
by the CB and comprehensions from the public are examined. Note that since the
Taylor rule is a single equation in two unknowns - χx and χπ, there are in theory
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an infinite number of solutions for the two parameters (ψx, ψπ) for a given level of
the interest rate i. The different Forward Guidance scenarios in this exercise take
this into account and differ in the way that agents understand CB’s announcements.
Each scenario is preceded by a long simulation of an economy without a ZLB so that
the transition matrices Φ and ψ have converged to the true REE with not ZLB at
t = 0.
1. No Change Suppose he monetary policy reaction function does not change.
The parameter values are the same as in normal times, just now the economy
is subject to the ZLB.
ψx,T = ψx,0 = χx,0, ψπ,T = ψπ,0 = χπ,0 ∀T ≥ 1
This scenario is useful for observing how the learners deal with the ZLB non-
linearity.
2. Full Communication Let the Taylor coefficient on output gap increases from
χx,0 = 0.1667 to χx,T = 1 for T > 1. The CB fully discloses this and people
completely internalize it so that ψx,t = χx,t and ψπ,t = χπ,t. All following
models feature the exact same policy regime change. Naturally, it may be ex-
pected that the Full Communication benchmark model is with highest welfare
(discussed later in Section 1.6.2).
3. No Communication Here the Taylor rule does change as aforementioned,
yet no Forward Guidance is provided, so during the ZLB the agents keep their
pre-crisis beliefs about the Taylor coefficients. Once the ZLB is over, agents
gradually update their perceived Taylor coefficients as in (1.13) and (1.16).
4. Unambiguous Forward Guidance The Central Bank announces its ex-
pected terminal date of ZLB - TCB, and agents correctly understand that the
output gap Taylor coefficient was the one changed. They then update it lin-
early so that T zlb = TCB. Note that TCB implies that ÊCBt−1iTCB ≤ i∗ and
ÊCBt−1iTCB+1 > i∗. The agents, however, cannot know the exact value of the
expected interest rate at TCB and instead assume iTCB = i
∗, which may result
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it errors in their update: ψx,t 6= χx,t. They update their beliefs by solving a
linear equation which satisfies the FG message:


















5. Confused Forward Guidance The Central Bank announces its expected
terminal date of ZLB - TCB, and agents wrongly understand that the inflation
Taylor coefficient was the one changed. They then solve for ψπ,t analogously
to the Unambiguous Forward Guidance case above in (1.23).
6. Ambiguous Forward Guidance The Central Bank announces its expected
terminal date of ZLB - TCB, and agents update both ψx,t and ψπ,t. They use
their estimated variance-covariance matrix Qt−1 to weigh each parameter and
avoid indeterminacy.
ψt =ψt−1 + λQ
−1









where λ ≥ τ is the weight they put on the FG announcement. Varying λ
reflects how much credence the FG has received, with higher values of λ putting
more weight on FG relative to the previous beliefs. The effects of different λ’s
are shown in the next section.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Impulse Response Functions
In all model scenarios the economy is initiated having converged to the Steady State.
For adaptive learners this means that all variables are zero and agents’ PLMs Φ and
ψ coincide with the true rational expectations equilibrium in normal times - that is,
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with no binding ZLB. This convergence is achieved in a training simulation sample
with no ZLB. To obtain impulse response functions (IRFs), each model is simulated
5000 times6 with a Taylor rule respecting the ZLB. The simulations are needed since
adaptive learners need variability in ret and µ to be able to consistently update the
parameters of their PLM. Otherwise, if there were no consecutive shocks, after the
initial shock experiment has died out the agents would no longer have variability in
zt to update their PLM and the values for Φ will stay constant at a wrong level. The
median responses7 of the estimated transition matrices Φ and ψ are preserved and
used to reconstruct IRFs from a single natural rate shock (the same as the initial
one used in the simulations):
εr1 = −0.05, εrt = 0 for t ≥ 2
εµs = 0 ∀s
This procedure avoids any variability coming from the Monte Carlo (MC) simula-
tions and taking the median values of output gap, inflation and the interest rate
directly. An alternative approach proposed by Eusepi and Preston (2011) is for each
MC draw to estimate the economy twice - once with the initial experiment shock;
and once without (i.e. only with white noise). Then the IRFs will be the median
of the differences between the two economies for each MC draw. This procedure
gets rid of the MC variability in the final IRFs, but creates a bias in the series due
to the ZLB (Eusepi and Preston (2011) do not impose a ZLB constraint). Since
the experiment economy is subject to the ZLB while the control economy is always
above due to the small noise shocks.
The rational expectations IRFs in presence of an occasionally binding ZLB are
obtain through the algorithm ’OccBin’ by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). A model
with such a constraint is identical to a model with two regimes - one in which the
constraint is slack, and another where it is binding. Then, using an initial guess
and standard perturbation techniques, iterating backwards from the expected lift-
6Larger number of simulations saw no gain in approximation.
7Note that due to the ZLB on interest rates, taking the mean responses instead would have
resulted in an upward bias in the interest rate and a downward bias in the output gap on average.
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Figure 1.1: Rational Expectations Impulse Responses






























off date from ZLB a candidate piecewise linear solution for the binding constraint
regime is obtained. The procedure is repeated until convergence and results in
piecewise linear policy functions for the endogenous variables.
Rational expectations benchmark
As pointed out, non-rational expectations are required in order for a policy param-
eter change to prolong the ZLB. Figure 1.1 depicts how fully rational agents would
behave in the two policy regimes - χx = 0.1667 and χx = 1. The duration of the
ZLB is identical between the two economies with interest rates paths on top of each
other. The more aggressive reaction to the output gap does ameliorate the downturn
slightly, but the observationally equivalent interest rate paths rule out any extension
of the ZLB and potential gains from Forward Guidance since the (shadow) interest
rate in both economies reacts one-to-one to the demand shock. The rational agents
internalise the policy structure by construction, which changes the aggregate law of
motion and output and inflation, resulting in their faster recovery.
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Model 1: Baseline model with no policy change
This exercise is used to illustrate the behaviour of the economy with adaptive learners
and a binding ZLB. The main results are that the downturn is exacerbated, the ZLB
prolonged and the aggregate transition matrix Φ changes drastically in the new
environment of an inelastic interest rate. Since no policy change occurs, and under
the maintained assumption of shared expectational facilities between the agents and
the CB, there is no role for Forward Guidance since T zlb = TCB at all times and the
agents’ expectations of the interest rate path coincides with the actual. Marinkov
(2018) studies a model where the Central Bank knows the model of the economy
and observes the learning agents’ expectations. He shows that the ZLB causes a
disagreement between the agents’ and the CB’s forecasts for the trajectory of the
policy rate and the duration of the ZLB spell. This gives a new role for Delphic
FG to align market expectations with the CB’s. Here disagreement does not occur
because both the agents and the CB know the Taylor rule and policy preferences
remain unchanged.
Figure 1.2 shows the projected Taylor rule path under the Baseline model of no
policy change and no communication. The blue dotted line is the projection for the
interest rate path at the onset of the crisis (before agents realize the ZLB binds)
and the left-most vertical line stands for the last ex-ante anticipated period of ZLB.
As the interest rate is fixed at i∗, however, the economy lacks monetary policy’s
accommodative capacity, hence, the real law of motion under ZLB is different from
the ex-ante converged PLM. Agents then revise their PLM for x and π, keeping
the learned Taylor rule unchanged and understanding that the rate will remain zero
for the implied (and updated every period) amount of time. This leads to the red
dashed expectations of the interest rate path, where the right-most vertical line
stands for the actual last period of ZLB (this understanding of the vertical lines is
preserved throughout the paper). Because agents need to estimate how the economy
will behave in such an unknown environment, they estimate ΦT to fit closer real-time
observations, thus creating a lag in the actual recovery.
Figure 1.3 presents the four parameters of Φt that represent the PLM across
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Figure 1.2: Interest rate paths
Model 1: Baseline, no policy change model









time. The vertical lines are as before, while the horizontal stand for the SS of each
parameter. The policy function parameters with respect to the cost push shock µ
stay constant as only the natural rate shock is active during in the simulations.
Figure 1.3: Aggregate transition matrix Φ
Model 1: Baseline, no policy change model





Φ(1, 1): x to re





Φ(2, 1): x to µ





Φ(1, 2): π to re





Φ(2, 2): π to µ
Note: the blue solid line is the value; the black horizontal line is the Steady State value
Finally, Figure 1.4 displays the reactions of expected and actual output gap
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and inflation. The blue dotted lines again are the ex-ante expectations of how the
crisis will affect the endogenous variables. The red dashed line, however, shows that
the ex-post and actual movement of the output gap and inflation features a much
prolonged crisis of large output losses and slightly bigger deflation. Again, this is
due to the lack of monetary policy accommodation through elastic interest rate at
the ZLB.
Figure 1.4: Output Gap and Inflation
Model 1: Baseline, no policy change model






























Comparing Figures 1.1 and 1.4 shows that the recession is milder under ADL
than RE. This is so because the learners do no internalize the future effects that a
binding ZLB will have on future output gap and inflation, while rational agents do.
The learners account for the ZLB n their individual problems ((1.1) and (1.2)), but
adjust their expectations of future output gap and inflation only adaptively upon
new observations. This feature is behind the inherent smoothness of learning models
that Milani (2007) shows explain business cycle facts well. This difference will prove
important later when constructing conditional forecasts of the endogenous variables
in Section 1.8.
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Figure 1.5: Output Gap and Inflation
Model 2: Full communication of policy change




























Model 2: Full Communication
With a fully internalized changed reaction to output gap - ψx = χx, the model
performs similarly to Model 1. The actual ZLB period is prolonged by 2 quarters
due to the stronger reaction of the interest rate to negative output gap. Because the
agents internalise long-run interest rate projections in their decision making, this
ameliorates the downturn in output by 3%. The net effect, however, is not obvious
since agents are slow to update their PLMs and the output gap overshoots its target
(Figure 1.5).
Model 3: No Communication
Agents do not know that χx = 1 and continue to believe ψx = χx = 0.1667. Thus,
they do not correctly foresee the last period of ZLB and expect it to be sooner
(Figure 1.6). This set-up is reminiscent of the vague open-ended FG issued by the
FED between 2008-2011 (see Engen et al. (2015)). This lack of internalization of the
future accommodative policy leads to a harsher recession compared to Model 2. In
fact, because of the adaptive nature of the economy, when agents do not internalize
the stimulus from a more aggressive reaction to output gap, their expectations and
22
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Figure 1.6: Interest rate paths
Model 3: No communication of the changed policy









the realizations of x and π are very similar to the ones from the baseline Model 1.
Interestingly, the deeper recession from doveish expectations and the actual hawkish
policy result in a very prolonged period of ZLB - 14 quarters, or 2 quarters more
than the Full Communication case.
When the ZLB is over and agents gradually update their perceived Taylor coef-
ficients, they entirely confuse the new policy regime - ψx is adjusted downwards, ψπ
upwards (Figure 1.7). Convergence to the truth occurs in the long run.
Model 4: Unambiguous Forward Guidance
Here agents correctly understand that the Central Bank’s announcements signify
a change in the reaction to the output gap and update their beliefs as previously
outlined in Section 1.4. Before Forward Guidance, on impact of the shock the
economy dips into a deep recession as in the Baseline Model 1. Later, however,
as agents receive the FG messages and update their beliefs the economy recovers
quickly and overshoots even more than in the Full Communication Model 2. This
again leaves the net effect of the policy change unclear (Figure 1.10).
The perceived Taylor coefficient on output gap jumps as soon as the information
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about the CB’s reaction function has been received. The learning is not perfectly
accurate as mentioned earlier and the estimates drift away from the truth in the
transition back to the REE values in the long-run (Figure 1.7).
Model 5: Confused Forward Guidance
The agents wrongly update ψπ in response to Forward Guidance. Since both output
gap and inflation are below target, there still exists a ψπ such that T
zlb = TCB and
the agents manage to closely track the interest rate path, albeit with wrong Taylor
coefficients (Figure 1.7). During the great recession, for example, the United States
experienced low output and inflation at the same time, while the United Kingdom
saw inflation floating above target. A solution for ψπ is not guaranteed in the latter
case here.
Model 6: Ambiguous Forward Guidance
Through Forward Guidance the agents are given a single anchor - iTCB = i
∗. Up to
now they had a single estimate (either ψx or ψπ) to match the news and hence the
path of the interest rates. Now, however, the agents are free to change both Taylor
coefficients. To avoid indeterminacy (2 instruments for 1 anchor) they are assumed
to update them according to their historical weights - the VCV matrix Q. In this
way they still manage to approximate the interest rate path after the ZLB, yet their
estimates of the Taylor coefficients are wrong. This happens because the Taylor rule
is a single equation in two unknowns - χx and χπ, and there are infinitely many
combinations of the two that satisfy Êt−1iTCB = i∗. Figure 1.8 plots the estimated
values of the Taylor rule for different update weights λ for the FG message in the
recursive least squares algorithm (1.24). The darker lines stand for higher values of
λ, with a maximum of λ = 1, i.e. FG is the same weight as the entire history of
observations, to a minimum of λ = τ = 0.02, i.e. FG is given the weight of a single
data point. The reaction to the output gap is indeed updated upwards. But since
both coefficients are changed, the reaction to inflation first jumps up and then drops
below the true value. Eventually, the agents will learn the correct values, but it
would take more than 300 quarters even for the model with highest reaction weight
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Figure 1.7: Taylor rule coefficients










6: Ambig FG with λ=1.00










The implications for output gap and inflation are shown in Figure 1.9. A weak
message (low λ) results in a lower overshoot of the output gap, but also in lower
inflation and output gap in the initial stages of the crisis. Due to the very steep
schedule for the output gap this difference sometimes amounts to 2-3% compared
to Model 4: Unambiguous FG. As the next section will show, this together with
the difference in inflation which has a high welfare weight for the CB results in low
welfare for the Ambiguous FG models.
1.6.2 Welfare Analysis
Figure 1.10 plots the relative output gap and inflation dynamics in all the different
models, respectively. Table ?? presents the welfare losses of each scenario. The
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Figure 1.8: Taylor rule coefficients
Model 6: Ambiguous Forward Guidance


















Figure 1.9: Paths for the Output Gap and Inflation
Model 6: Ambiguous Forward Guidance
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which is used by Eusepi and Preston (2010) in the derivation of the Taylor coefficients
of the Baseline scenario. Naturally, the Full Communication model performs best
followed by the Unambiguous FG model and Confused FG. These models outperform
both the Baseline and the No Communication model with respect to both output
gap and inflation. Therefore, in the former models the initial boost of output gap
and inflation after the policy change are more than enough to offset the negative
effect of the output gap overshooting in later periods. Interestingly, even all the
cases of Ambiguous FG outperform the No Communication Model 3. Thus, if a
Central Bank was considering a policy change similar to the one described here, it
would be better off communicating this to the agents through Forward Guidance.
Of course, this result holds under the assumption of common expectational facility
between the CB and the agents. Hence, the agents understand the nature of FG as
clarifying a policy change and do not mistake it for a pessimistic prognosis (Delphic
FG)8.
Table 1.1: Welfare Losses
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Odyssean FG
No change Full Comm. No Comm. Unambig. FG Confused FG FG shocks
total 165.5712 121.6338 165.5686 145.2381 150.2124 150.7157∑
x2 3891.0823 2368.4768 3891.1160 3328.9318 3666.5521 3183.6913∑
π2 146.1158 109.7914 146.1131 128.5935 131.8797 134.7973
Model 6: Ambiguous FG
λ = 0.02 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.3 λ = 0.5 λ = 0.8 λ = 1
total 165.1382 163.6390 160.8773 159.0180 156.9034 155.8127∑
x2 3857.9714 3758.1448 3624.6171 3588.5302 3581.0165 3588.7283∑
π2 145.8483 144.8483 142.7543 141.0754 138.9983 137.8691
×10−6
8See Woodford (2012) and Walsh (2014) for further commentary.
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Figure 1.10: Output gaps across models






















Figure 1.10 shows that the economies of Model 1: No change and Model 3: No
Communication behave almost identically despite the different policy undertaken
by the CB. This happens because during the ZLB uninformed agents would not
know that a policy change has occurred and the economy will be identical to the
baseline. Later, the different Taylor rule is only gradually learned (Figure 1.6) and
the aggregate PLM is updated accordingly (Figure 1.11). Therefore, in the long run
agents will learn the new parameters of the economy and future shocks would see
the two economies diverge.
As aforementioned, an alternative specification of Forward Guidance widely used
in the literature is through news shocks as in Del Negro et al. (2012). The interest
rate rule then is:




where εFGl,t−l are publicly known FG shocks at time t − l that keep the interest rate
at the ZLB at time t despite the standard Taylor rule, it = χππt + χxxt, calling
for a raise. This is an example of an Odyssean FG. Viewed through the policy
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Figure 1.11: Aggregate Perceived Laws of Motion
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exercises of Section 1.5 this approach corresponds to an economy where the true
Taylor coefficients remain unchanged (Model 1: No change), but the interest rate
remains at the ZLB as if the policy had changed and people understood it (Model





T zlb = TCB
}M2
, where superscripts stand for the model number from
Section 1.5. Figure 1.12 plots the output gaps and inflation for the cases of Full
Communication, No Communication and Odyssean FG. Both variables perform best
under Model 2: Full Communication, while the Odyssean FG slightly outperforms
Model 3: No Communication9. It is interesting to see that the Forward Guidance
puzzle documented by Del Negro et al. (2012) is gone with ADL rather than RE
agents with the current policy change. As discussed above, this is due to the adaptive
updating of expectations for the learners while the RE agents internalize news about
the future in the present. Related to this, the literature has solved the counterfactual
strong stimulative effects of FG in RE models (FG puzzle) by introducing discounting
tin the Euler equation (see Campbell et al. (2012)).
Figure 1.12, moreover, shows schedules from hybrid economies which contain the
9According to Table ??, the Odyssean FG setup is better than providing no information, but is
inferior to the other models of a Taylor coefficient change and FG.
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Taylor coefficients and ZLB series from Model 2: Full Communication coupled with
the aggregate PLM - Φ matrix, from Model 3: No Communication and Odyssean FG
shocks model, respectively. The purpose of this exercise is to decompose the effects
from the policy experiment on the endogenous variables coming from changes in the
aggregate PLM and the perceived Taylor rule. With the crossing the schedules for
output gap shift up and resemble the overshooting nascent for the Forward Guidance
models (i.e. Models 2, 4 and 5). The ones for inflation, however, are completely
identical (the red lines coincide with the blue and are thus hidden). This occurs
because, as discussed, the stimulus in this economy comes mainly from the interest
rate channel, which only directly appears in the aggregate demand equation (1.1),
while only Êt−1xT = [φx,rT φ
x,µ
T ]Êt−1zT enters the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(1.2) and the Φ matrix is kept unchanged as in Model 3 and Odyssean FG10. Albeit
not perfect, this decomposition illustrates that the bulk of the difference between
the different models does indeed come from the particular policy change and the
information possessed by the private sector. The future discounted policy behaviour
in the ALM results in an overshoot. This is similar to the transmission channel of
Odyssean FG but does not affect inflation which depends on the slowly adjusting
expectations of the learners. This explains the lack of the FG puzzle present in
the RE model of Del Negro et al. (2012). These results show that the length of the
ZLB period is of secondary importance and strengthen the case for clear informative
communication provided by the Central Bank for changes in its reaction function
which brings the bulk of the stimulus.
1.8 Heterogeneous expectations
The different models can be interpreted as agents having heterogeneous beliefs but
mass measures of zero and hence not affecting the aggregate law of motion11. In
particular, agents may have different understandings of what the CB really means
10The reversed crossings: with ΦM2 and Taylor coefficients from Model 3 and Odyssean FG also
resemble closely the economies from which the Taylor coefficients series are taken. This is not
plotted in Figure 1.12 for less clutter.
11One could argue that professional forecasters are also a small portion of the economy, for
example.
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Figure 1.12: Crossing models’ Φ and ψ
Output gaps and Inflation





















when it uses Forward Guidance. Some will very well understand, some will update
one parameter with some noise and some will link the announcement to historical
trends and update both coefficients.
A similar idea with agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the meaning of
Forward Guidance is proposed by Andrade et al. (2019). In their model the hetero-
geneity between agents comes from some believing that FG is Odyssean - therefore,
expansionary; and others perceiving it as Delphic, or pessimistic and contractionary.
Andrade et al. (2019) show that in this way they can generate realistic heteroge-
neous expectations of output gap and inflation, while keeping short run interest rate
expectations fairly homogeneous. The authors also show evidence that this is the
observed pattern in the data from the Great Recession.
In the setup here agents short run interest rate expectations are also very ho-
mogeneous - that is, they agree on the duration of the ZLB that the CB announces.
But their estimated Taylor coefficients are very diverse (Figure 1.7) as well as their
updated transition matrices Φ (Figure 1.11). Thus, that their expectations of out-
put gap and inflation, which depend on Φ, are also diverse, despite the agreement
on the interest rate path.
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Figure 1.A.1 in the appendix plots the total disagreement between the lowest and
highest projections for the future of the three endogenous variables across all models.
The one year ahead forecasts show a significantly higher disagreement than the 2 year
ones. This is in line with Andrade et al. (2019) and the data. Additionally, Andrade
et al. (2019) find that the disagreement about output gap and inflation forecasts
relative to the interest rate path disagreement increased in the data at time when
FG was used. Accordingly, Figure 1.A.2 presents the relative forecast disagreements.
The observed pattern of high relative disagreement following FG is preserved. In
fact, the magnitude of relative output disagreement is similar to the one in the
data (Figure 1.A.3). Inflation responsiveness to policy change and FG in the model,
however, is weak. This is also evident in Figure 1.10 above as inflation varies much
less across models as does the output gap. This occurs since agents incorporate FG
in their decision making by having an implied projection path for the interest rates
and the period under ZLB. As adaptive learners they cannot know how a policy
will affect the aggregate law of motion of the economy - Φ, and hence even though
they understand how the ZLB will affect them individually, they are unaware of the
consequences this will have on the economy - that is, they keep updating Êt−1xt and
Êt−1πt gradually as in normal times. Forward Guidance decreases the real interest
rate here mainly through the nominal interest rate channel and not through higher
expected future inflation as in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Marinkov (2018) introduces the lagged policy rate as a state variable which
improves the interest rate’s transmission channel to inflation expectations of the
learners. Nonetheless, the adaptive learning framework is much less forward looking
than rational expectations and alternative specifications with more forward-looking
behaviour are an important area for future research.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper studied the effects of Forward Guidance (FG) from a novel perspective.
Instead of considering FG as a promise for future actions (Odyssean) or providing
better forecasting facilities (Delphic), the Central Bank in the model is giving a
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signal about its own reaction function. This was shown to be in line with what
Central Banks have tried to communicate during the crisis.
To evaluate FG the paper assumes that agents are non-rational adaptive learners.
The Central Bank then uses FG as a communication device to signal a policy change
in the Taylor rule to the agents. The mechanism builds on the lack of real-time
observations under ZLB that adaptive learners could otherwise use for learning the
new policy function.
The main findings are that clear communication increases welfare compared to
no communication. Nevertheless, if the message has been too vague and agents
view it through the lens of past observations, providing Forward Guidance is barely
superior than giving no signals at all. Forward Guidance at the ZLB, however, is
shown to create a persistent drift in agents’ Perceived Law of Motion which might
cause instability and welfare losses due to future shock realisations. This is an
important and novel insight and is left for future research.
Finally, the model is able to replicate some features of the data on private fore-




Figure 1.A.1: Heterogeneous expectations
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Figure 1.A.2: Relative Forecast Disagreements
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Figure 1.A.3: Relative Forecast Disagreements in Data
The figure provides the ratio of disagreement on 1-year (red line) and 2-year (blue line)
ahead consumption growth and inflation to disagreement on 1-year and 2-year the short-
term interest rates. Disagreements are measured as a moving average over the last 4 quarters
of the 75/25 inter-quantile range in the distribution of corresponding individual mean point
forecasts. The shaded areas correspond to the periods of the ZLB and “open-date” forward
guidance, “fixed-date” forward guidance and the “state-contingent” forward guidance.
Source: Andrade et al. (2019)
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Table 1.A.1: Parameter values
Param Value Source






ξ = 1.667 -——-
γ1 0.7866 -——-
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Communication at the Zero Lower
Bound: The Case for Forward Guid-
ance
2.1 Introduction
The unprecedented length of the period when interest rates were limited by the
zero lower bound after the Great Recession has spurred a large literature trying
to understand the behaviour of the economy in such novel circumstances. This
phenomenon was also accompanied by unconventional monetary policy instruments
to which Central Banks resorted once the interest rates were no longer flexible.
This paper focuses on one of these instruments - namely, forward guidance, and
strives to provide a structural justification for its use. The literature on forward
guidance (FG) largely agrees that the main channel of influence of FG is the in-
formation conveyed for the future path of the policy rate. There are two main
classifications of FG depending on the underlying reasons for its use. The seminal
work of Krugman et al. (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) showed that
promises of lower interest rates for longer can largely mitigate the negative effects
of a binding zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates. The stimulus comes through
agents expecting low interest rates in the future (i.e. accommodative monetary
policy) and higher inflation, hence cutting back less on present investment and con-
sumption. Campbell et al. (2012) label this approach Odyssean Forward Guidance.
Campbell et al. (2012) also acknowledge a more established form of FG, pursued
by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Riksbank in Sweden, for example. In
essence, CBs engage in regular forecasts of the path of their policy rate, hence it was
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dubbed Delphic Forward Guidance. This type of FG may be useful to the public if
the CB has better information about the state of the shocks that hit the economy.
Moreover, in Marinkov (2018) I propose another function of forward guidance as a
communication strategy for policy change. There, the ZLB acts as an informational
curtain for adaptive learners who fail to perceive a potential policy change as the
policy rate is bound by the ZLB. Then, forward guidance is a useful tool in helping
them learn the new policy regime through announcing future lift-off dates1.
Here I built on this previous work but pursue a more fundamental reason for FG.
Instead of considering a policy regime change, I show that the non-linearity intro-
duced by ZLB itself acts as a regime change for adaptive learners and this creates
disagreement between their policy rate forecasts and the Central Bank’s forecasts,
who knows the precise structure of the economy. Therefore, FG acts as a helping
hand for learners to update their perceived law of motion of the economy under
the ZLB regime. Such information revelation about the structure of the economy
is akin to Delphic forward guidance. Although empirically supported by Campbell
et al. (2017), these authors and others2 only incorporate Odyssean FG through an-
ticipated monetary policy shocks in their models and do not study theoretically or
numerically the effects and nature of Delphic FG. The model here allows for Del-
phic FG by showing a channel which could explain the observed policy rate forecast
disagreement in the data between central banks and the private sector.
The main message is that the zero lower bound calls for a necessary increase in
transparency and communication by the Central Bank at the ZLB because it acts
both as a regime change and an information curtain preventing agents from correctly
adjusting their expectations about the path of the interest rate. First, forward
guidance is shown to have a welfare-improving effect by helping the agents update
their expectations even in the absence of interest rate observations. The benefit is not
negligible, but neither is it huge, so no forward guidance puzzle is present. Second,
1Marinkov (2018) explores various communication and interpretation schemes for the FG signal.
Wrong interpretation or small weights of the signal are shown to still be marginally over no com-
munication at all. The stimulative effects of a prolonged ZLB duration are modest and no forward
guidance puzzle is present.
2see Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Del Negro et al. (2012), Campbell et al. (2012), Ben Zeev
et al. (2017) among others
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forward guidance helps prevent an expectational drift due to agents expecting an
earlier lift-off from the ZLB. This is numerically shown to improve the stability of
the system by keeping it tighter within the basin of convergence to the rational
expectations equilibrium. This is a novel result which complements prior work on
the stability implications of monetary policy in learning models (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2003)). In the simple model this communication is achieved through
forward guidance, yet in reality a combination of FG and asset purchases might be
needed to achieve the necessary shift in expectations. For instance, Campbell et al.
(2017) and Andrade et al. (2019) show that FG was successful at shifting short-term
expectations but quantitative easing was more adept at affecting the longer end of
expectations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides evidence for the disagreement
between the Central Bank and private agents at the ZLB. Section 3.4 presents the
model, while Section 2.4 studies the effect of forward guidance. Finally, Section 2.5
concludes and discusses future work.
2.2 Motivation
The Great Recession and the followed long spell of binding ZLB were unprecedented
events that caught the public by surprise. Andrade et al. (2019) show that this lead
to very high levels of disagreement by historical standards among private forecasters.
Additionally, agents often expected earlier lift-off than the Central Bank but this
could be due to policy changes (Marinkov, 2018; Engen et al., 2015). To disentangle
the disagreement between the CB and the private agents both their forecasts are
needed. Among major central banks the Swedish Riksbank is one of the few who
publish internal consensus interest rate forecasts along with private market forecasts.
They began releasing their internal forecasts in the 2007 issue of their Monetary
Policy Report.
Figure 2.2.1 plots the 1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead repo rate forecasts for both
the Riksbank (solid lines) and the public (dashed lines). As expected, they are not
too disparate from one another, yet there are two important features of data. First,
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whenever interest rates are expected to be binding to some lower bound, the private
forecasts are always supportive of an earlier lift-off than the Riksbank’s. Second,
Sweden is a special case among developed economies because it dipped twice to the
zero lower bound (ZLB), thus it provides more comparable data above and below
the ZLB and allows for testing the theory that the ZLB causes disagreement between
the CB and the agents.
















































Source: Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Report 2007-2018
To quantify the disagreement between the agents and the Riksbank Table 2.2.1
computes the difference between the forecasts of the Bank and those of the market.
The measure is set up such that a positive disagreement means that the Riksbank
expects higher future repo rate than the market. The data is split in two regimes
- Low and High, where Low is classified as expected 1-year-ahead repo rate to
be smaller than 0.25, and High - to be larger than 0.25. The table shows the
classification according to future expected repo rates by both Riksbank and the
market. Further robustness classifications on horizons and cut-offs are performed in
Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2.1: 1-year-ahead disagreement on Swedish repo rate
Based on private agents’ expected 1-year-ahead repo rate
count mean se(mean) min max
Low 16 -.1135 .0085 -.18 -.05
High 24 .0107 .0755 -.79 .91
Based on Riksbank’s expected 1-year-ahead repo rate
count mean se(mean) min max
Low 18 -.1391 .0192 -.37 -.05
High 21 .0616 .0804 -.79 .91
Note: ’High’ and ’Low’ states refer to 1-year-ahead expected repo rate above
or below 0.25, respectively. The first block defines ’High’ and ’Low’ based on
private agent’s expectations and the second - on Riksbank’s forecast.
Source: Riksbank Monetary Policy Report (2007-2018)
Table 2.2.1 shows that regardless of the classification private agents expect an
earlier lift-off than the CB (negative and significant average disagreement) when the
economy is a Low regime of near zero interest rates. Moreover, the High regime
of normal times exhibits no systematic forecast bias for either party. As a case in
point, Figure 2.2.2 shows that during the first ZLB spell in 2009 agents expected a
higher interest rate path than the Bank, but already a year later when the interest
rate left the ZLB expectations aligned perfectly.
It is worth noting that disagreement between the Riksbank and the market con-
tinued throughout the ZLB spell. This is an unexpected fact because of Riksbank’s
open and explicit interest rate forecasts which one would expect are one of the most
transparent and informative means of CB communication. Perhaps, the market did
not put a high enough weight on their routine announcements while the unprece-
dented forward guidance by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England among
others had a notable effect on market expectations as shown by Engen et al. (2015),
Andrade et al. (2019) and Campbell et al. (2017). See Marinkov (2018) on the im-
plications of imprecise or unconvincing forward guidance in a model with learning
agents.
Finally, a similar study of disagreement is not possible for the USA because the
Federal Reserve does not publish its internal consensus forecasts. Yet, Figure 2.2.3
shows the average expectations of professional forecasters in the US. It is seen that
the period of explicit date- and state-contingent forward guidance (2011-2013) saw
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Figure 2.2.2: Forecasts of Swedish repo rate 2009-2010
Source: Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Report 2009-2010
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market expectations converging closely to what ended up being the actual rate. Yet,
before that period and even after it around 2015 market expectations were higher
than what the T-bill rate ended up being. This is indirect evidence of a similar
pattern as observed in Sweden above.
Abstracting from disagreement, Campbell et al. (2012) find that future mon-
etary policy tightening lowers unemployment expectations and increases inflation
expectations in the US, contrary to the predictions of New Keynesian models. They
interpret this finding as evidence for successfully communicated Delphic forward
guidance by the FOMC. Campbell et al. (2017) study empirically the hypothesis that
FOMC’s meeting announcements carried Delphic forward guidance. They classify
private information of the FED by the difference between the Greenbook forecasts
on inflation, GDP growth and unemployment rate and Bluechip survey of private
forecasters’ expectations. They find that the four-quarter ahead futures contract
rate is statistically positively correlated with policy makers’ forecast of future GDP
growth being higher than the market expects (and lower for unemployment). This
is evidence that the committee’s private information about the future of the econ-
omy was transmitted through the FOMC’s announcements - supporting a Delphic
forward guidance interpretation.
2.3 Model
To explain why disagreement between the Central Bank and the private agents
arises at the zero lower bound I build a simple New Keynesian model featuring
adaptive learning as an expectation formation framework for the agents. Marinkov
(2018) outlines in detail the difference between rational and learning agents and how
each model interacts with the non-linearity of an occasionally binding ZLB. Notable
differences in the current paper are the reduced form knowledge of the Taylor rule
by the agents and the presence of the lagged interest rate as a state variable. As will
later become clear the first assumption eliminates the simultaneity in determining
the output gap, inflation and the policy rate, while the second makes the learners’
forecasts of output gap and inflation more responsive to the ZLB - a necessity pointed
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Figure 2.2.3: Private Forecasts of US T-bill rate
Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters
out in Marinkov (2018).
2.3.1 Rational Expectations
The model environment is the canonical New Keynesian model with a represen-
tative consumer and monopolistically competitive firms subject to Calvo pricing.
As extensively discussed in Woodford (2003), under rational expectations (RE) the




(it − Etπt+1 − rt) (2.1)
πt =κxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (2.2)
with shock processes




t ∼ N(0, σ2r ) (2.3)




t ∼ N(0, σ2u) (2.4)
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where xt is the current output gap, defined as the difference between output and its
natural rate in an economy with fully flexible prices; πt denotes the inflation rate; it
the nominal interest rate; β is the discount factor; σ is the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution of consumption; and κ is a convolution of structural parameters. All
endogenous variables are expressed as log-deviations from their steady state values.
Thus, in steady state x = π = i = 0. Finally, rt and ut stand for exogenous natural
rate and cost-push shocks, respectively, and follow AR(1) processes.
The model is closed with a Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB).
it = max {i∗, δit−1 + (1− δ)(χππt + χxxt)} (2.5)
where the reaction parameters satisfy χπ > 1 and χx > 0, and the interest rate
smoothing δ ∈ (0, 1). The constant i∗ = 1 − 1/β < 0 represents the effective lower
bound on interest rates since, otherwise, as explained in Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) agents would choose to hold all their assets in cash. I will refer to it as the
ZLB to be consistent with the arguments in the Introduction and with real world
analogies.
2.3.2 Expectations formation
The specification of expectations employed is adaptive learning (ADL). In partic-
ular, agents do not know the true structure of the economy and make forecasts
as econometricians using simple regression models3. Namely, they make forecasts
according to the aggregate policy functions from the minimum state-variable RE
















 ≡ ΓZt (2.6)
where due to the smoothing in the Taylor rule, the lagged interest rate becomes a
3Following the ’consistency principle’ of Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
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state variable4.
Adaptive learning is a linear updating procedure, yet the ZLB creates a non-
linearity in the expectations for the path of the interest rate, because agents must
understand it cannot be realised below i∗. To get around this issue I model the
agents as forming expectations about the shadow interest rate and then applying
the ZLB to their expectations. However, they use realised rather than shadow prices
when forming expectations of xt and πt. The shadow rate is needed during a period
of binding ZLB such that agents could form lift-off expectations consistent with the
known policy prior to the ZLB. If they were to use i−1 = i
∗ as a basis for expectations
for t = 0, 1..., they would have an upward bias in their projected paths for the
interest rate because the ZLB i∗ is higher than the shadow rate at t = −1. Hence,
as described below, I assume that above the ZLB agents rely solely on realised prices.
When the ZLB binds, on the other hand, due to a lack of exact observable data on the
policy rate, they rely on their shadow rate projections for the full path of realisations
of it. Thus, even though the use of a shadow rate complicates the notation, this
dichotomy is necessary for more realistic and sophisticated expectations. In this
sense the imperfect knowledge of the agents here is conservative.
The agents have similar forecasting models to (2.6), as shown below. But each
period as additional data becomes available, they update the coefficients to their
perceived transition matrix Φt following a recursive constant gain algorithm. They
are assumed to observe the disturbances rt and ut and to know their autoregressive
coefficients 5.
Adaptive Learning




the state variables vector where st is the shadow
interest rate. Note that above the ZLB the Taylor rule (2.5) implies that the actual
and shadow interest rates coincide - that is it = st if st > i
∗, while st could go below
the ZLB and then it = i
∗. This distinction is vital for the correct formulation of
4Note that (2.6) represents the solutions of the model under RE without a ZLB. If the ZLB is
respected, when binding the solution of the model will be piece-wise linear featuring a sequence of
different policy transformations Γi for every period i when the ZLB is binding.
5Eusepi and Preston (2010) show that this assumption can be dispensed with and instead agents
would estimate those coefficients. For simplicity, it is maintained.
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expectations of the agents because output gap and inflation are determined by actual
prices (i.e. by the actual interest rate it). As mentioned above, on the other hand,
the trajectory for the interest rate is determined by the shadow rate since otherwise
the policy smoothing in the Taylor rule would create artificial upward drift in the
interest rate due to the ZLB being an inefficiently high rate last period - it−1 = i
∗
but st−1 < i
∗.
Then, just like in the rational expectations solution in (2.6) the learning agents





. Unlike RE, however, they do not know the correct
transition matrix Γ from (2.6) and instead use their perceived 3-by-3 transition
matrix Φt−1 from the end of period t − 1. Remember that the RE state variables




. Given the discussion above I
assume agents use Zt to form expectations of the output gap and inflation, but they















, j ≥ 0
(2.7)
where Ê is the expectations operator for the learners and φn,t is the nth row of their
perceived 3-by-3 transition matrix Φt. Agents update this perceived law of motion
(LOM) by a recursive constant gain algorithm using the discrepancies between their
expectations of endogenous variables ÊYt and the actual realizations Yt. They weigh
this discrepancy by the historical variance-covariance matrix Rt−1 of the endogenous
variables and use the weighted forecast discrepancy for error correction. Each error
correction term is given a constant gain weight τ against their prior beliefs from
t− 1 6. Finally, they update the VCV matrix Rt in a similar fashion.
6Note that here I assume constant gain learning instead of the decreasing gain learning used in
Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The reason is that the former is more useful for tracking regime
changes, while the latter is useful for studying asymptotic convergence properties of learning models
to their RE counterparts. Given the current emphasis on the ZLB, tracking is a necessary feature
of the model.
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φ3,t =φ3,t−1 + τR
−1
t St(it − Êtit)




2.3.3 Bounded Rationality and the Actual Law of Motion
Replacing RE with ADL means that the structural equations of the economy (2.1)-
(2.2) need to be modified accordingly. For a related class of models Preston (2005)
and Eusepi and Preston (2016) argue that under ADL aggregate expectations Êt are
an average of the expectations of heterogeneous households and firms who know only
their own objectives, constraints and beliefs and cannot compute aggregate probabil-
ity laws, i.e. cannot obtain model-consistent expectations like RE. Thus, agents act
rationally when it comes to their own objective functions but unlike rational agents
fail to anticipate the aggregate laws of motion and resort to econometric learning
as in section 2.3.2. A representative agent occurs when a symmetric equilibrium is
assumed in which although everyone’s problem is identical, no individual is aware of
that and as a result the representative agent cannot compute aggregate probability
laws. This breaks the law of iterated expectations (LIE) for the operator Ê, and
hence the recursion from which the aggregate demand (2.1) and Phillips curve (2.2)
equations are derived. These two equations under ADL and Ê then depend on a















(αβ)T−1 [κ(xT + uT ) + (1− α)βπT+1] (2.10)
where Êt again stands for the expectations of the adaptive learners and α is the Calvo
probability of not being able to reset prices. I will refer to these two equations as
the actual law of motion (ALM) of the economy.
Yet, Honkapohja et al. (2012) point out that assuming a continuum of sym-
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metrical agents as is the case in the used NK model, one could still apply the LIE
and resort to one period ahead Euler equation learning. I keep the infinite horizon
learning for two reasons.
First, it allows for incorporation of FG as information about future policy rates
into the law of motion for the aggregate variables, contrary to the Euler equation
learning approach. Second, because agents do not know the structure of the economy,
they cannot foresee how the ZLB will change the actual law of motion of the system.
Take equation (2.1) and apply Ê instead of the RE operation like the Euler equation
learning approach advocated by Honkapohja et al. (2012) would prescribe. Now, if
the ZLB is expected to be binding for a few periods ahead, its effect should come
through expectations of the output gap (Êtxt+1) and inflation (Êtπt+1). But these
are only gradually updated (as described in section 2.3.2), implying that although
agents respect the ZLB in their forecasts for the interest rate, they are completely
oblivious of its future effects on inflation and the output gap when only the Euler
equation (2.1) is used. In contrast, suppose that agents expect t = TZLB as the
last period of binding ZLB. Then in the long horizon approach (2.9) they could set
Êtit+s = i∗ for all t + s ≤ TZLB. Then, the expected duration of the ZLB has
an effect on the realisations of the output gap both through the current and future
binding periods, which in turn is reflected on future inflation as in (2.10). Thus,
the economy driven by the learners features minimal deviations from the rational
expectations economy which are reflected only in the recursively updated Êt+sxt+s+j
and Êt+sπt+s+j for s ≥ 1, j ≥ 0.
Disagreement between the CB and the learning agents
Suppose the economy exists for a long enough period with no extreme shocks that
bring it to the ZLB. Then, following the forecast and updating procedures from
section 2.3.2 the learning agents converged to the RE solution of the model in (2.6).
This implies that at some period t− s the perceived transition matrix has converge
to the actual one - Φt−s = Γ. Therefore, the agents have fully learned the model
with no binding ZLB. The period of the Great Moderation is a useful analogy for
this scenario.
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Now, suppose the economy is hit by a demand shock εr at period t which brings
the interest rate to the ZLB for at least 2 periods. Since the agents respect the
ZLB in their expectations they know that today the interest rate will be at the
ZLB - Êit = i∗. Hence, from (2.8) the error correction term for the interest rate’s
law of motion is zero and no updating occurs - φ3,t = φ3,t−1. On the other hand,
their perceived LOMs for output gap and inflation (φ1,t−1 and φ2,t−1) are the first
and second rows of the transition matrix for a world with no binding ZLB (Φt−1 =
Γ). A model prescribed by Γ is characterised by a fully flexible Taylor rule which
accommodates demand shocks. This, however, is no longer true with a binding ZLB
which locks the interest rate at an inefficiently high level i∗. Therefore the agents’
forecasts for time t will be based on t − 1 beliefs of the Great Moderation and will
be too optimistic. At the end of period t they will observe the realisations and
update their expectations as in (2.8). Overall, during the expected period of the
ZLB the agents will not update their perceived Taylor rule for the shadow rate but
will update their beliefs for the laws of motion of output gap and inflation.
I assume the Central Bank knows the ALM of the model (2.9) and (2.10) and
observes agents’ expectations ÊYt for all endogenous variables7. Upon observing
agents’ expectations the CB plugs them into the ALM equations (2.9) and (2.10) and
obtains model-consistent forecasts. Given its projections for output gap and inflation
it uses the Taylor rule (2.5) and forms projections for the shadow rate. Because
the CB’s shadow rate forecasts are based on constantly updated Êt expectations
through the ALM, it is better able to anticipate the trajectory of the interest rate
than the agents, who due to their fulfilled expectations of a binding ZLB in the
immediate future fail to adjust the law of motion for the interest rate (φ3,t+s = φ3,t−1
if Êt+s−1it+s = i∗) and expect an earlier lift-off. Thus, they gradually update their
output gap and inflation expectations, but the binding ZLB prevents them from
understanding how the new regime changes the dynamics of the Taylor rule even in
the absence of an explicit policy change. The only source of change in the system is
the ZLB which affects the propagation of the state variables Zt to the endogenous
7Considering the vast amounts of information collected and processed by central banks as well
as their sophisticated forecast models this does seem like a realistic assumption.
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variables Yt
Proposition 1. Suppose the economy is brought to the zero lower bound after a
period of convergence to a rational expectations model with no binding ZLB. Then,
the mechanics described above result in a disagreement between the agents and the
Central Bank about the future path of the interest rate even in the absence of any
policy change. Namely, the agents expect an earlier lift-off from the ZLB than the
Central Bank.
2.3.4 Forward guidance
Henceforth, I assume that in order to correct the disagreement about the future
path of interest rates the CB uses forward guidance (FG) by truthfully revealing
its expected lift-off date during every period of a binding ZLB. Next I describe
how forecasts are made and the considered experiments of the use of FG. The next
section presents simulations for each experiment and discusses their implications and
effectiveness.
Forecasting
Every period the agents form long-run expectations Êt {xj , πj , ij , sj}∞j=t as outlined
in section 2.3.2. This allows them to estimate the last period of binding ZLB defined
as:
T ag such that




The Central Bank is assumed to have rational model-consistent expectations,
but no choice variable and to truthfully reveal its expectations, thus abstracting
from strategic behaviour. It observes agents’ expectations (ÊtYt+j , j > 0 and T ag)
and uses them to form expectations according to the structural equations of the
model (2.9)-(2.10). Then it sets its instrument it according to the Taylor rule (2.5)
and in a similar fashion to (2.11) obtains its expectation of the last period of bind-
ing ZLB - T cb. As per Proposition 1, we would have T cb > T ag, because agents’
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expectations adjust to reflect the new regime8 brought by the ZLB only gradually
through observations. This disagreement about the path of the interest rate is the
rationale for FG.
Experiments
At period t = 1 the economy is in its RE equilibrium above the ZLB. Then a large
persistent natural rate shock (εr2 - see Table 2.B.1), pushes it to the ZLB. Both the
agents and the CB anticipate a lift-off date according to the described procedures
above. Whenever forecasts disagree, there is scope for forward guidance. Three
cases of such CB communication are considered. In all cases where communication
occurs, the CB is assumed to release its beliefs truthfully, abstracting from strategic
behaviour.
1. Baseline no FG - the agents expect a lift-off at T ag and are surprised by the
continuing ZLB. They gradually update their beliefs by comparing st and it.
2. FG as the length of the ZLB spell - the CB releases T cb and if different
from T ag, the agents adopt it outright in their expectations. This is reflected
in the aggregate demand equation (2.9). Note that in this case the law of
motion for the interest rate is not updated, so even at lift-off date (T cb) there
might be some disagreement between the CB and the agents.










i∗ − ÊtiT cb
)
(2.12)
• Equation (2.12) shows that now when the CB announces T cb the agents
try to adjust their perceived LOM for the shadow rate such that as of
today their expectations for date T cb are for Êtit = i∗.
8as manifested through the transition matrix Φt.
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• here λ = τ gives weight to FG announcements as 1 quarter worth of data.
Variation in λ can proxy how credible or well understood FG is.
2.4 Experiments
This section presents the conducted experiments and results. Throughout, I use
the parameter and shock values from Table 2.B.1 in the appendix 2.B.1. Impulse
responses are calculated as point-wise median from 5000 simulations of random iid
εr and εu shocks. This is done in order to provide enough variability for the learners
to update their perceived transition matrix. The zero lower bound is respected
throughout and the only commonality between simulations is the negative natural
rate shock at period t = 2.
2.4.1 No forward guidance
Figure 2.4.1 below shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of xt, πt and it
(both expected and realised) to an -8% natural rate shock in period 2, which results
in a prolonged period of binding ZLB. The bold black line shows the actual end-
of-period realisations of the endogenous variables, while the dashed red line is the
beginning-of-period expectations of the agents. Both expectations and realisations
are, as expected, below the schedules which would have occurred was there not ZLB
constraint. Moreover, as explained in previous sections, agents’ expectations of fu-
ture output gap and inflation only change with observations even if they understand
what the ZLB means for the path of the interest rate. Thus, initially they expect
a faster recovery, yet since the ZLB changes the economy’s response to shocks, the
actual output gap and inflation turn out to be lower. The constant gain learning
results in a quick updating of beliefs and convergence of the dotted and solid lines.
Note that without FG the agents’ projected shadow rate will be identical to the
hypothetical one if no lower bound constraint existed (green thin solid line). Figure
2.4.2 below zooms in on the end of the ZLB spell to highlight the disagreement
about the lift off date between the agents and the CB. Even in this parsimonious
model disagreement does occur and it is around 150 basis points at period 9 when
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Figure 2.4.1: no FG - IRFs
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the agents expect lift-off next period. A richer model featuring more persistence
(e.g. habit formation or price indexation) as used by central banks today is likely to
produce even larger disagreements. Finally, Figure 2.4.3 plots the expected duration
of the ZLB of both agents and the CB when asked at every period. Disagreement
persists with agents consistently expecting a 3-4 quarters shorter ZLB duration than
the more informed CB.
2.4.2 ”Period” forward guidance
Now suppose whenever disagreement occurs at the beginning of a period (as in Figure
2.4.3), the CB announces T cb and the agents outright adopt it without changing their
perception of the law of motion for the interest rate. Naturally, now the expected
durations of the ZLB coincide throughout (Figure 2.B.1 in appendix 2.B.2). This
situation is akin to the framework of forward guidance as anticipated shocks by
Del Negro et al. (2012). Agents understand the length of the ZLB spell will be
different but do not update their perceived LOM of the interest rate. Notably the
agents’ perceived LOM during the ZLB is misspecified but since no updating has
occurred, it is in fact the correct one upon exit from the ZLB.
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Figure 2.4.2: no FG - interest rate paths











Figure 2.4.3: no FG - Anticipated duration of ZLB
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2.4.3 Update from forward guidance
Such smooth transfer of information as above is not very likely in practice. In
this scenario the CB again announces T cb but instead of directly adopting it, the
agents use their usual learning procedure aiming to adjust their expectations for the
interest rate at time T cb (ÊtiT cb) to equal i∗. Note that this communication scheme
resembles the conditional FG that CBs have implemented in practice.
There are two differences with this learning step compared to their usual updat-
ing. First, it regards further than 1 period ahead forecasts. Second, the learning gain
(λ) here can be varied to emulate the credibility of the message released by the CB.
Here it is assumed that λ = τ = 0.02, or the agents view CB’s FG announcements
as just another data point. See Marinkov (2018) for comparisons of the effects of
different λ’s. The learning for FG announcements (2.12) is restated below.




i∗ − ÊtiT cb
)
A benefit of the ”learning FG” scenario is that it could be beneficial in cases of
earlier or delayed lift-offs than announced due to future shocks. Agents could better
anticipate those if they have updated their perceived LOM for the interest rate. A
potential downside compared to the ”period” FG above is that this communication
causes an expectational change in the perceived law of motion of the agents which
might threaten the stability of the system.
Figure 2.4.4 shows the corresponding anticipated ZLB durations. Given that the
agents solve a linear problem in order to match the announced lift-off date (2.12),
it is no surprise that their perceived duration of the ZLB coincides with the CB’s
announcement. Notice that in period 4 the common perceived duration drops below
the value of the no communication case in Figure 2.4.3. This happens because of
the feedback of the updated long-run agents’ expectations from (2.12) into the ALM
(2.9) and (2.10).
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Figure 2.4.4: ”Learning FG” - Anticipated duration of ZLB












Figure 2.4.5 plots the cumulative welfare loss associated with the cases for forward
guidance described above. It is computed through a standard central bank welfare
loss function: Lt = Lt−1 + β
t−1 (π2t + 0.5x2t ). Naturally, period forward guidance
has the best welfare outcome since it results in full agreement and in contrast to
the learning forward guidance it does not create any expectational drift from the
announcements. Thus, after lift-off agents still hold their pre-crisis beliefs about the
law of motion of the interest rate, which are in fact the correct ones for the case of
above the ZLB. Although this is welfare improving, the gains are marginal and no
forward guidance puzzle is present.
2.4.5 Beliefs’ drift and Stability
This section discusses the underlying updating of beliefs in the three experiments.
Figure 2.4.6 shows the drifts in the elements of the transition matrix Φt mapping
states into expectations of endogenous variables. Although in the long-run these
converge back to their equilibrium values under RE9, they exhibit a prolonged drift
9Due to constant gain learning instead of decreasing gain learning they converge to a distribution
centered around their RE values (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001)
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Figure 2.4.5: Welfare losses











away that lasts much longer after the ZLB is no longer binding. Regarding the
welfare of the economy in the presence of future volatility this may be important in
richer models or if shocks had larger variances such that future binding ZLB periods
were more likely. Note that it is also consistent with the findings in section 2.2 where
private expectations in Sweden remained higher than the CB’s even in the end of
the second ZLB spell.
Importantly, the drift is especially dangerous in the case of no communication.
As already established, the agents expect an earlier lift-off than the CB. After their
last anticipated period of ZLB - T ag, they expect an interest rate above the ZLB
but observe it still remains at the ZLB. This causes them to increase their perceived
persistence of the policy rate through their learning algorithm (2.8). All figures
above are median outcomes from Monte Carlo simulations. Nonetheless, during
these simulations I find that over 10,000 draws and 500 periods over half of the
draws end up in instability due to perceived unit root in the law of motion of the
interest rate. Figure 2.4.7 plots the impulse responses of an identical economy as in
the no communication case but it allows for moderate future shocks after the initial
period. The familiar disagreement about the lift-off date and the severity of the
crisis are still present. This time, however a sequence of very small negative demand
61
Chapter 2 2.4. EXPERIMENTS
Figure 2.4.6: Drift in perceived transition matrix Φ
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shocks in period 12 push the economy beyond the bounds of stability. As established
above, after their expected lift-off date (period 9) the agents observe a still binding
ZLB which causes them to increase their perceived persistence of the interest rate.
Iterated in their medium-run expectations in the ALM (2.9), this creates a boom in
the economy around period 12. The Central Bank increases the interest rate in order
to tame the boom, but this creases more disagreement in the interest rate forecasts
with the agents. Given the small negative shocks at period 12 and the increasing
policy rate, the agents again are lead to belief that the interest rate depends more
on its past value rather than shocks. This again affects the medium to long-run
expectations of the agents who now (around period 18) expect very high interest
rates in the future, thus causing the economy to experience a recession. The CB,
following its Taylor rule, quickly lowers interest rates, thus creating yet another big
disagreement between with the agents. This causes even higher perceived persistence
of the interest rate until around period 30 it surpasses 1 (unit root) and renders the
economy explosive. The trajectory of the policy rate disagreement and the continual
drift towards a unit root of the perceived persistence of the interest rate are depicted
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Figure 2.4.7: no FG - single simulation IRFs






output gap - x
actual
agents ÊtYt
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in Figure 2.4.8.
The learning literature has long established that the stability of the economy
is greatly improved by a CB which reacts not to actual data as assumed here, but
to the expectations of the agents (see Evans and Honkapohja (2003)). This is a
remarkable analytical result in environments with no regime changes such as a zero
lower bound. Here, I numerically make the case that FG can greatly improve the
stability of a system with occasionally binding ZLB even when the CB reacts to
contemporaneous data. The reason for this is that the communication provided by
the CB provides a workaround for the unobservable shadow rate to the agents who
adjust their expectations. This helps minimize the initial expectational drift caused
by the ZLB period and keeps the economy tighter within the basin of convergence,
which greatly improves its stability.
Forward guidance in both of its iterations considered above has a stabilizing effect
on the economy by keeping expectational drift at bay, thus preserving stability.
Figure 2.4.8 shows on the first row the disagreement between the agents and the
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CB for the interest rate nowcast and on the second the AR(1) persistence in the
perceived law of motion of the interest rate in the same Monte Carlo draw as in
Figure 2.4.7 10. Although the two FG schemes exhibit some disagreement after
the lift-off date, it is very contained and does not cause big drifts in the perceived
persistence of the interest rate. The case of no communication, however, shows that
disagreement keeps growing even after the lift-off and this is fuelled by an upward
drifting perceived interest rate persistence. Once the perceived interest rate reaches
1, the system becomes explosive due to the long-horizon expectations in (2.9).
Thus, the last result of the paper is the forward guidance can be used at the ZLB
to restore stability to the system. This is so because if no communication is issued,
the learners will wrongly think the prolonged ZLB reflects higher persistence in the
interest rate. Their updating quickly leads them to believe there is a unit root in the
interest rate’s law of motion since it does not react to shocks (the shadow rate does,
but it is unobserved). When this happens, the economy becomes unstable. Forward
guidance prevents this spurious drift in expectations and preserves the stability of
the economy.
2.5 Discussion
This paper shows that the zero lower bound calls for a necessary increase in trans-
parency and communication by the Central Bank because the ZLB kink distorts
private agents’ expectations of the trajectory of the policy rate. The private agents’
and Central Bank’s expectations diverge because the Bank is better able to un-
derstand the effects of the new ZLB regime on the aggregate law of motion of the
economy. In particular, a binding ZLB causes private agents to expect and earlier
lift-off than the CB does. In the simple model communication is achieved through
forward guidance, yet in reality a combination of FG and asset purchases might be
needed to achieve the necessary shift in expectations. The discrepancy is not negli-
gible, but neither is it huge, so no forward guidance puzzle is present. Importantly,
forward guidance can be used as a stabilizing tool to ensure stability at the ZLB by
10Figure 2.B.2 in the Appendix shows how an economy with the same sequence of shocks as in
Figure 2.4.7 but with period FG preserves its stability has suffers less volatility.
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Figure 2.4.8: Interest rate disagreement (Êag−Ecb) and perceived AR(1) persistence
of interest rate
















preventing spurious expectational drift.
Avenues for future work include allowing for Central Bank learning and con-
sidering optimal policy. A different expectation formation in the form of rational
inattention also has the potential to explain disagreement and the effectiveness of
forward guidance 11.





2.A.1 Robustness policy rate forecasts disagreement - Swedish Riks-
bank
Table 2.A.1 performs robustness checks on disagreement between the Riksbank and
private agents. As in Table 2.2.1 in Low regimes agents expect on average higher
interest rates than the CB (disagreement is negative and significant). In High states
there is no significant disagreement between the CB and the agents at 3-months and
1-year forecast horizons. Interestingly, there is some evidence that at 2-year forecast
horizons the Riksbank expect higher interest rates than the agents (disagreement is
positive and significant). This might be due to better long-run forecasting abilities
of the Central Bank or it might reflect a private agents’ perception of more past-
dependent policy compared to what the CB claims.
Table 2.A.1: Disagreement on Swedish repo rate
Based on private agents’ expected 1-year-ahead repo rate
Etit+1y ≶ 0.25 Etit+1y ≶ 0.75
mean se(mean) mean se(mean)
dis 3m low -.011 .0051 -.0426 .018
dis 1y low -.1135 .0085 -.1502 .0213
dis 2y low -.3111 .0414 -.306 .038
dis 3m high -.0376 .0423 -.0128 .0458
dis 1y high .0107 .0755 .0616 .0804
dis 2y high .1539 .0807 .2157 .0826
Based on Riksbank’s expected 1-year-ahead repo rate
Etit+1y ≶ 0.25 Etit+1y ≶ 0.75
mean se(mean) mean se(mean)
dis 3m low -.0322 .0155 -.041 .0172
dis 1y low -.1391 .0192 -.1822 .0378
dis 2y low -.2947 .0384 -.3262 .0414
dis 3m high -.0128 .0458 -.013 .0482
dis 1y high .0616 .0804 .1042 .0717
dis 2y high .2157 .0826 .262 .072
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2.A.2 Estimating the Taylor rule
I use US data to estimate the following Taylor rule with policy smoothing:






α 0.75 sticky prices last for 3 quarters
β 0.99 implying 4.1 % annual rate of return
κ 0.024 Woodford(2003)
σ 3 implying IES of 13
ρr 0.9 arbitrary
ρu 0.4 irrelevant
ρi 0.85 consistent with staff estimates
σr, σu 0.015 only for welfare loss calculations
εr2 -0.07 a ”Great Recession” shock
τ 0.02 standard in learning lit; robust to changes
2.B.2 Figures
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Figure 2.B.1: ”Period FG” - Anticipated duration of ZLB












Figure 2.B.2: period FG - single simulation IRFs
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Returns to skill and Industrial Sort-
ing
3.1 Introduction
In this paper I analyse the sorting of workers to industries, studying whether strong
positive assortative forces prevail in the data as they do in our theories, and whether
the patterns differ across countries. Studying the sorting of workers to jobs accord-
ing to their skills is important as the exact allocation of skills in production has large
efficiency implications depending on whether there are complementarities or substi-
tutes between and within skills and technologies. The strength of assortative forces
in a country also affects the returns to skill and, as a result, the wage inequality.
The precise study of assortativeness often relies on matched employer-employee
datasets, which although becoming gradually more accessible are still hard to obtain
and limited to a few individual countries and industries. Here I use a novel dataset
on workers’ skills in OECD countries, which allows me to define new measures of
assortativeness and examine its differences across countries. I find that assortative
forces differ along the skill ladder of industries such that top-skilled industries have
stronger assortative allocations of workers. Moreover, I show evidence that the devel-
opment of a country is associated with stronger assortative forces and less mismatch.
Industrial development towards the frontier in turn is shown to be systematically
related to returns to skill - a novel finding which motivates the theoretical model.
Technological change is at the heart of the increase in sorting observed in recent
decades1. Here I focus on the importance of complementarities and returns to skill
1Section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature. See Buera et al. (2018) and H̊akanson et al. (2015),
among others.
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rather than skill-biased technological change. I build a model which illuminates the
differences in returns to skill across sectors and countries as a driving force behind
the levels of assortativeness and mismatch within and across industries. The model
extends the frictionless 1-to-1 matching model of Becker (1973) and the frictional
model of Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), and incorporates two sectors to which agents
can sort on top of their matching in teams. Due to the presence of search costs
randomly matched team members might choose to stay together even if a second-
stage match would team them differently. The degree of sectoral cross-match is
shown to be decreasing in the difference of returns to skill between the two sectors.
Intuitively, if workers have a lot to gain by moving to the correct sector, they are
more likely to re-match despite the search cost. Interestingly, in the model rich
countries are found to have lower within sectoral matching bands, but larger cross-
sectoral mismatch for a given search cost. This is caused by the overall higher
returns to skill in rich countries but also smaller differences between sectors. To
explain the uncovered higher cross-mismatch in poorer countries in the data, the
model implies that poor countries must exhibit higher and perhaps additional types
of labour frictions than rich ones.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by showing evidence of the
connection between returns to skill and the sorting of workers across countries. The
model developed, on the other hand, shows the mechanism though which returns to
skill drive sorting and identifies a trade-off between tighter within-industry matches
versus higher cross-industry mismatch present in richer countries.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relevant literature
regarding returns to skill and assortativeness in the labour market. Section 3.3.1
studies the relationship between returns to skill and industrial development towards
the frontier, while Section 3.3.2 analyses assortativeness across industries and coun-
tries. Section 3.4 develops a model of frictional matching and sorting, calibrates it
and presents numerical results about the nature of assortativeness in rich and poor
countries. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
Studying sorting has been historically difficult due to the requirements for detailed
micro-level data on worker abilities. Earlier attempts relied on measures of segre-
gation of similar workers at a firm or plant level. Examples include Kramarz et al.
(1996) who find that segregation of workers has increased in France between the
late 1980s and early 1990s and Kremer and Maskin (1996) who show the same for
the UK and US. Moreover, Dunne et al. (2004) test the theoretical hypothesis of
Caselli (1999) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) that differential rates of technological
adoption across plants results in increased sorting of workers and wage dispersion.
For the US they show that the between-plant wage and productivity dispersions
have been growing over the prior decades and are a growing part of the rising total
wage dispersion.
Relying on segregation measures suffers from the possibility that skill-biased
technological progress, international trade and specialisation can cause wage dis-
persion without changing the underlying sorting patters of workers. Following the
seminal methodology of Abowd et al. (2002), later studies have attempted to study
sorting as imputed from the more common but still not commonplace matched
employer-employee wage data sets. Bagger et al. (2013) analyse a full population
Danish matched employer-employee dataset panel for 1980-2006. They study the
correlation between worker and firm fixed effects which can be interpreted as ”wage
sorting”. Their panel data allows them to study the evolution of this correlation
and they show it has been steadily increasing throughout most of the sample period.
They further show that this increase is exclusively driven by changes in the covari-
ance of the two fixed effects and that it is not caused by compositional changes in
the labour force in terms of education, age, and gender. Finally, they show that the
rise in wage sorting explains 41% of the increased wage inequality in Denmark. Sim-
ilarly, Card et al. (2013) find stronger assortative wage matching in West Germany
between 1985 and 2009.
Nonetheless, Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) argue that using wage data alone it
is impossible to determine the sign of the sorting due to the non-monotonicity of
73
Chapter 3 3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
wages in the firm’s type. Intuitively, wages for a given worker are higher when
matched with a correspondingly ranked firm because in a lower productivity firm
the marginal product of the worker is lower, while a higher productivity firm would
only match with a lower ranked worker if he or she accepts a pay cut.
Taking all these considerations into account, H̊akanson et al. (2015) show that
higher sorting and stronger complementarities help explain the rise in wage inequal-
ity, and confirm that inferring sorting from wage distributions may indeed be mis-
leading. The authors study how the sorting of workers to firms has changed over
time through the use of direct cognitive and non-cognitive skill measures linked to
firm level data in the entire Swedish private sector. They decompose the variance of
both types of skills into within and between firm and industry components. Then,
they document that between 1986 and 2008 within firm variance has decreased and
between firm variance has increased - all pointing to an increase in sorting2. Inter-
estingly, the lower overall within firm variance has been largely driven by stronger
sorting at the firm level rather than the structural move towards industries with
inherently higher sorting. Lastly, the authors show that more high skill-intensive
firms exhibit more positive assortative matching.
This discussion illustrates the importance of having direct measures of workers’
ability when studying their sorting and matching patterns. The Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) is a novel dataset that
measures the cognitive abilities of workers in a large set of OECD countries. Al-
though available only at the 2-digit industry and 2-digit occupation levels, these data
allow for direct comparison of the nature of workers’ sorting in different countries
without imputing it from wage data as previously discussed. Using the self-reported
mismatch component of PIAAC McGowan and Andrews (2015) study skill and qual-
ifications mismatch in 19 OECD countries. They find that higher mismatch of both
skills and qualifications is associated with lower firm productivity and lower alloca-
tive efficiency. The former stems from the standard complementarities and positive
assortative matching argument, while the latter might be explained by the restric-
2H̊akanson et al. (2015) also use bootstrap techniques to confirm that the sorting in the data is
orders of magnitude higher than what a random matching of workers to firms would imply.
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tions that mismatch poses on the growth of high-productivity firms. For instance,
they show that mismatch explains around 20% of the difference in allocative effi-
ciency between the US and Spain or Italy. Similarly, Pellizzari and Fichen (2017)
develop a richer methodology for defining upper and lower proficiency bounds for
well-matched workers using PIAAC and find that on average 75% of workers are
well-matched, yet this masks a large heterogeneity across countries.
The sorting of workers according to skill is directly affected by the returns to
skill in different occupations, industries and countries. That is, high-skilled workers
are likely to sort to jobs where their skills are rewarded the most. These forces in
turn affect not only sorting but also wage inequality in a country. A few papers
have used the PIAAC dataset to study the returns to skill and wage inequality at a
granular level. Broecke et al. (2017) ”use full distribution accounting techniques . . .
to decompose cross-country differences in inequality into differences in skills prices,
on the one hand, and skills endowments, on the other”, also accounting for supply
and demand conditions. They find that skill prices are far more important than skill
endowments in explaining cross-country differences in wage inequality. Moreover,
they show that market forces contribute just as much as labour market institutions
to the difference of wage inequality relative to the USA of the other participating
countries - namely 25%.
Taking advantage of the harmonised cross-country cognitive scores in PIAAC,
Hanushek et al. (2015) show that higher numeracy, literacy, and problem-solving
scores are all systematically positively related to higher wages in all participating
countries. However, the authors find large differences in returns to skills in countries
- from 28% in the USA to only 12% in the Nordic countries, Italy and the Czech
Republic, and call for better understanding of the relationship between individual
skills, labour market outcomes and productivity. In a follow-up work, Hanushek
et al. (2017) use the second round of PIAAC containing more countries to uncover
even larger cross-country differences in returns to skill. They also find that prior
GDP growth is strongly positively correlated with returns to skill, which they argue
might be a sign of high-skilled workers coping better with change.
Exploring further the richness of PIAAC, Grundke et al. (2017a) document that
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the dispersion of skills among countries is higher within industries than across in-
dustries. This suggests that the relative skill requirements of industries are broadly
comparable across countries. They also point out that high-skilled services (e.g.
Finance and Insurance) have the highest average worker skills. The authors show
that higher cognitive skills are robustly related to higher productivity at the in-
dustry level beyond the effects of educational attainment. Through factor analysis
they further extract ”task-based” skills from the questionnaire portion of PIAAC
and find that the so-called ”ICT skills” is the only factor consistently positively
correlated with productivity in all industries, but is especially prominent in services
and high-skilled occupations. This finding might be explained by the importance of
skill-biased technological change for productivity growth3, related to the finding of
Hanushek et al. (2017) above. Finally, cognitive skills are found to have a strong
positive correlation with global value chains integration of an industry4. The top of
the skills distribution is much more strongly and significantly correlated with pro-
ductivity or trade, suggestive of assortative matching between workers, firms and
industries.
The present paper contributes to the literature on mismatch, complementarities
and sorting by studying both empirically and theoretically the sorting of workers to
industries and comparing the assortativeness of the labour market outcomes across
countries. Thus, it bridges the micro-level labour literature with the macro-level
structural and technological change literatures.
3.3 Empirical
The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC)
developed by the OECD conducts the Survey of Adult Skills in over 40 countries 5
3See Berman et al. (1998), Acemoglu (1998), Caselli (1999), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and
Buera et al. (2018) and references therein among others.
4In a follow-up study Grundke et al. (2017b) explore the theory of Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007)
that bundles of skills affect comparative advantage and find supportive evidence.
5Round 1 (2008-2013): Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (England and North-
ern Ireland), United States
Round 2 (2012-2016): Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Lithuania, New Zealand, Singapore, Slove-
nia, Turkey
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and evaluates workers’ proficiency in literacy, numeracy and problem solving6. The
measures of literacy and numeracy are very closely correlated, while the problem
solving indicator has a much smaller sample and is based on computer usage which
differs across countries. For instance, Pellizzari and Fichen (2017) show that 90% of
workers who are well-matched in literacy are also well-matched in numeracy, pointing
to a substantial overlap in the two measures; while Broecke et al. (2017) find that
the correlation between numeracy and literacy is 0.91 and their main findings hold
for both measures (see Section 3.2). Thus, following Hanushek et al. (2015) and
Broecke et al. (2017) I will rely on the measure of numeracy to represent workers’
skills7.
Apart from workers’ scores, the PIAAC dataset also records their two digit ISCO
occupation and two digit ISIC industry of employment and in some cases wages.
Henceforth, I will use ”sectors” for broad classifications such as agriculture, manu-
facturing and services and ”industries” for more granular classifications (e.g. at 2
digits); I will also use scores and skills interchangeably. To avoid any industrial bias
due to natural resources or institutions, I omit agricultural, energy and governmen-
tal industries in my analysis. Appendix ?? shows which industries are selected and
how they are labelled across the three broad economic sectors - manufacturing, low-
skilled services and high-skilled services. Note that although the numerical score is
naturally an incomplete measure of a person’s characteristics, H̊akanson et al. (2015)
have shown that sorting at the industry level is much more important for similar
cognitive measures than for non-cognitive ones, and increasing over time for both.
3.3.1 Structural change
Buera et al. (2018) show that a country’s development as measured by GDP per
capita is associated with a structural move towards high-skill intensive industries
and an increased skill premium. They label this phenomenon skill-biased structural
change. Their finding is robust across countries but it relies on a very rough mea-
Round 3 (2016-2019): Ecuador, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Peru, United States
6See Kankaraš et al. (2016) for a comprehensive survey of descriptive statistics in PIAAC.
7The definition of numeracy in PIAAC is: ”ability to access, use, interpret and communicate
mathematical information and ideas in order to engage in and manage the mathematical demands
of a range of situations in adult life.”
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sure of skill - namely, college versus non-college educated people. The secular move
towards more skill-intensive industries raises the question whether the same indus-
tries are expanding in all countries and what features of their production technology
affect the skill premium. Understanding the nature of the expanding skill-intensive
industries will allow us to study returns to skill and wage inequality even within
skill groups of workers.
To study this, I use the detailed PIAAC skills data to explore more granular
structural features of development related to the sorting of workers to industries ac-
cording to their skill level. I draw on the trade literature and construct an industrial
rank correlation of skills for each country8. I rank industries by their average scores
in each country and compare their ordering relative to the USA using a Spearman
rank regression. Theoretical rank correlations vary between a perfect match of 1 and
a polar opposite of -1. Column (e) in Table 3.3.1 shows that richer countries have
higher skill rank correlations, i.e. their industrial structure is more similar to the
US9. This confirms the findings of Sampson (2016) who finds that richer countries
have more similar wage rank correlations to the US in manufacturing industries
- a finding he attributes to differential costs of capital between countries. Table
3.3.1 complements his work by showing that the pattern holds even when skills are
precisely measured, not proxied by wages, and the services sector is also included.
The evolving ranking of industries by skills might also have implications for the
returns to skill in countries. Since workers sort across industries based on their
wages, a more similar sorting of workers (that is - a higher rank correlation) would
suggest a more similar return to skills between countries. Sampson (2016) finds
no such evidence when using school attainment as a proxy for returns to skill and
concludes that differential returns to skill are not related to wage rank reversals. The
PIAAC dataset, however, enables the direct estimation of cross-country returns to
skill. I obtain the returns to skill from a Mincerian regression of PPP-adjusted wages
8See Sampson (2016) for an application of rank correlations and assignment reversals to com-
parative advantage and wage inequality.
9Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A shows the equivalent regression for occupational rank correlations.
The relationship between development and occupational rankings is less robust suggesting that
occupations, unlike industries, might be driven by other national or idiosyncratic factors - e.g.
education and training system, preferences, tradition, etc. Expectedly, returns to skill are still
strongly correlated with occupational rank correlations rather than sectoral.
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and numerical scores following Hanushek et al. (2017) and include it as a regressor
in Table 3.3.1. All regressions net out the countries’ dispersion of skills defined
as the ratio of the 90-th to 10-th percentile of numerical scores, thus focusing on
the incremental importance of skills rather than distributional difference. Columns
(a) - (d) show a robust positive correlation between returns to skill and industrial
rank correlations regardless of the measure of development controlled for. This
suggests that the higher rank correlations of countries are to a large extent driven
by industries with high output elasticities to skill, thus resulting in higher returns
to skills. This is yet another piece of evidence showing that the industries which
tend to develop at the technological frontier are those where skills are rewarded
the most. This could be interpreted as more efficient allocation of skill in richer
countries - a hypothesis to which we return in the next section. This finding is
in accordance with the evidence shown by Buera et al. (2018) but in addition to
their work shows that the structural transformation has implications for the returns
to skill (and hence wage inequality) along the entire skill distribution rather than
merely between college and non-college graduates.
The higher returns to skills in countries with rank correlations closer to the US
is confirmed also from augmenting the Mincerian regression to include interaction
terms of individuals’ numeracy scores and their country’s rank correlation. Table
3.3.2 shows that the positive relationship holds in the economy as a whole but also
in different broad sectors such as those encompassing above or below median skilled
industries as well as the traditional split of industries into manufacturing and services
sectors. Table 3.3.2 shows that a country’s rank correlation has better explanatory
power for its returns to skill than its GDP per capita does. The regressions partial
out the mean and dispersion of skills as well as their interactions with the numeracy
score, thus abstracting from distributional skill differences across countries.
Overall, we have seen that development is accompanied by a systematic move
towards more similar industrial skill ranking. This industrial ordering is shown to
be closely related to higher returns to skill beyond what individual or distributional
country characteristics would imply. The results are consistent with those of Broecke
et al. (2017) who show that skill prices are much more important for wage inequality
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Table 3.3.1: Industrial Rank correlations
a b c d e
Returns to skill 0.24∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.26∗∗









Observations 25 25 25 23 25
Adjusted R2 0.360 0.319 0.426 0.361 0.157
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Lgdppc, Lckpc and Lhc refer to log deviations of GDP per capita, capital
per capita and human capital relative to the US as measured by the Penn World
Table. Mean VApc is the average value added per capita of at 4-digit industries
from the UNIDO’s INDSTAT4 dataset. To control for countries’ different skill
ditributions all regressions partial out the 90-th to 10-th percentile skill in each
country. The US is not included in regressions with rank correlations because
its rank correlation is trivially 1.
Table 3.3.2: Returns to skill and rank correlations
all sectors above median below median manufacturing services
Numeracy score 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
x Lgdppc -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.00 -0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
x Rank correlation 0.16∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.14∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Controls with interactions YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 25391 10339 14603 8592 16799
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: All regressions include personal controls as in (??), GDP per capita
and skill distributional controls and interaction terms. Country variables are
partialed out and weights are normalised so countries have equal total weight
of 1.
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than skill endowments within a country. These findings suggest that the sorting of
workers to industries is systematically related to the differences in returns to skill
across countries. The next section, therefore, delves deeper into the differences in
sorting and skill returns across industries and across countries.
3.3.2 Measures of Assortativeness
This section studies the strength of the sorting forces across countries and broad
sectors. First, it develops and motivates a metric which compares industries on their
assortativeness. Second, it tests the matching between managers and non-managers
for differences in assortativeness across countries.
To study the assortativeness of the sorting pattern of workers to industries, I
will compare the average type of workers against the standard deviation of types
within industries. To understand why this is a useful metric, suppose we are in a
frictionless matching world populated by workers with heterogeneous skills. Define
an industry (or a firm representative of an industry) as a team of N workers. Then,
if all teams consist of equally skilled workers, we say the sorting exhibits perfect
positive assortative matching (PAM). In this case the dispersion of scores within
each team is zero, while their average scores are all different and ordered. If we were
to plot all teams’ average scores against their dispersion of workers scores, we would
get a perfectly vertical line as in Figure 3.3.1 at zero dispersion. Building on the
seminal work of Becker (1973), Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) show that with com-
plementarity in production between workers and search frictions the matching will
exhibit imperfect PAM. Each worker will have matching bands for potential part-
ners rather than matching only with like-skilled workers. Importantly, the matching
bands have constant width across skill ladder 10. With dense enough population the
resulting matching will translate in a vertical region of constant thickness in Figure
3.3.1 at some dispersion bigger than zero. Thus, teams will again be ordered in their
average ranks, and at each average level of scores there is a constant variability in
scores dispersion.
10Acceptance bands are parallel to the matching function only in the special case of θ = 1
considered by the authors.
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Figure 3.3.1: Theoretical PAM




















Any deviations from such a pattern would imply deviations from PAM11. To
study this I construct a similar measure using the PIAAC dataset. To abstract from
the skill distributions differences across countries I standardize workers’ scores to
mean 0 and standard deviation 1 within each country. Due to the nature of produc-
tion industries hire occupations in different intensities. Occupations, however, differ
in their average levels of skills. What we are interested in is whether the best profes-
sionals of all occupations are matched together in an industry resembling PAM12, or
whether the sorting deviates from the theoretical first-best. Thus, to avoid compo-
sitional problems arising from using workers’ skills to classify an industry, I proceed
in three steps.
First, within each occupation across all industries I order workers according to
their standardized score and give industries an occupation-specific rank depending
on the average skill of professionals they hire of every given occupation. Since not
all occupations are hired in all industries the rank queues differ across occupations.
To deal with this I normalise the industries’ ranks within each occupation such that,
for example, the highest scoring industry in skills of economists, lawyers, managers
and so on get a rank 1 for the specific occupation, while the lowest ranked get rank
11Note that in the one-to-one matching case perfect negative assortative matching (NAM) is
represented by a flat horizontal line in Figure 3.3.1. In teams of more than two NAM is not well
defined.
12E.g. in the most skilled industry the best economists are matched with the best lawyers,
managers, etc.
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013. Second, I compute the average and standard deviations of normalised ranks
of the hired occupations within each industry. Thus, if an industry hires the most
skilled professionals of each occupation it uses, it will have an average rank of 1
and standard deviation of ranks 0. The use of ranks instead of scores avoids the
issues associated with industries using a different number and type of occupations
by measuring relative occupational ranking instead of overall numerical score. Thus,
the measurement is closest to the theoretical counterpart of assortativeness.
Figure 3.3.2 plots the mean skill rank of occupations in an industry against their
standard deviation of occupational ranks. Here all countries are pooled because
insufficient observations are available for individual countries at the 2-digit industry
by 2-digit occupation level. Rankings are based on standardized scores as described
above. Overall, the plot is reminiscent of the theoretical analogue of Figure 3.3.1
in that the dispersion of occupational ranks is fairly stable as mean ranks increase
even if dispersion differs across industries unlike the stylised theoretical result. A
distinct feature of the data, however, is that high-skilled industries (displayed in
circles and defined as above median average occupational skill rank) tend to have
lower dispersion of ranks, suggesting tighter acceptance regions for mismatched pairs
and overall stronger assortativeness. Highest dispersion of ranks is observed in
industries around the average mean rank. This feature of the data could be explained
considering that in the presence of search costs it is the average skill levels which
exhibit highest match-acceptance regions overlap. This futher translates in highest
cross-sectoral mismatch and hence heightened dispersion of occupational ranks. This
idea is further explained by the model in Section 3.4.
Thus, two main conclusions arise. First, perfect PAM does not hold across all
industries as in the theoretical plots (the vertical line at 0 in Figure 3.3.1) since
rank dispersion is significant. This motivates the introduction of search costs à la
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) in the model of Section 3.4. Second, assortative forces
13The normalisation works as follows. Suppose the order of industries for a given occupational
ranking is such that rank 1 is the industry hiring the most skilled professionals of the given oc-
cupation and every following rank (2...N) has decreasing average skilled workers from the same
occupation. Let the ranking queue for each occupation be qo. Then, ranks per occupation are
standardised such as 1 is the highest and 0 the lowest by: rnorm = 1 − r−1qo−1 ∈ [0, 1], where the
normalised ranks rnorm are the ones used in the empirical estimations.
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tend to be stronger in more skilled industries and there is highest cross-sectoral
mismatch at average skill levels.

















Note: Above and Below median are groups of industries which are respectively
 above and below the median average occupational skill rank in the pooled sample.
There are a few potential features of the data, however, which can be driving this
pattern instead of it being due to assortative forces. First, one might imagine that all
industries need managers (a relatively high-skilled profession), while only some use
low-skilled labour, hence the negative relationship between the mean and dispersion.
Remember, however, that Figure 3.3.2 is based on ranks within a profession, rather
than numerical scores. Thus, the measure is not subject to the aforementioned caveat
because it asks whether the managers employed in the low-skill intensive industry
are one of the best or worst managers. Second, it could be that the pattern above is a
result of specialisation of industries. In particular, it could be the case that the higher
skilled industries are more specialised in their occupations and outsource many of
the less-skilled or uncompetitive tasks14. Alternatively, the nature of production of
14H̊akanson et al. (2015) note that although firms in Sweden between 1986 and 2008 gradually
become more specialised in the type of workers they hire, the majority of the variance in skill
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some industries could be such that they hire very diversely skilled occupations, while
other hire very like-skilled ones. Even though the ranks measure is not susceptible
to average skill differences between occupations, it could still be the case that such
disparities of occupational types might affect the relative ranks of employees from
different occupations.
To inspect the latter set of concerns Table 3.3.3 shows the regression results by
broad sectors while controlling for the number of occupations in each industry to
account for any systematic differences between industries with many or only a few
occupations. Manufacturing and low-skilled services seems to exhibit no relationship
between average ranks and assortativeness. The main result from the regressions is
that services, and in particular high-skilled ones, are driving the pattern of stronger
assortative forces in higher-skilled industries consistent with Figure 3.3.2. When
industries are separated in above and below the median US industry skill it is again
the high-skilled industries which have more tightly matched workers despite the
control for number of occupations. Table 3.3.4 shows that the distributions of the
number of occupations by industry are comparable, with low-skilled services having
slightly higher average number of occupations.
Table 3.3.3: Mean rank by broad sectors in pooled sample
all M S L H > US med ≤ US med
SD ranks -1.12∗∗∗ 0.06 -1.50∗∗∗ 0.05 -1.71∗∗∗ -1.51∗∗∗ 0.75
(-3.48) (0.10) (-3.72) (0.06) (-4.37) (-4.82) (1.68)
Number of occupations -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗∗ -0.00
(-3.61) (-0.65) (-3.40) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-2.29) (-0.81)
Constant 0.92∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(9.83) (2.90) (9.46) (2.60) (8.93) (10.04) (2.54)
Observations 66 27 39 20 19 32 34
Adjusted R2 0.220 -0.056 0.344 0.037 0.497 0.424 0.090
t statistics in parentheses
Note: The broad sector abbreviations are as follows: M - Manufacturing, S -
Service, L - Low-skilled service, H - High-skilled services, > US med and ≤ US
med - industries with average skills above and below the median US industry.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
between education groups is within firms. This means that firms in all industries employ workers
from educational groups with very different average cognitive skills. This finding is even more
important when aggregated at the industry level as in the PIAAC dataset.
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Table 3.3.4: Number of occupations per industry by broad sectors in pooled sample
count mean sd
M 27 19.63 5.18
H 19 17.32 5.51
L 20 21.50 7.72
Total 66 19.53 6.26
To circumvent the issue of insufficient observations by industry-occupation-country
cells but still study cross country comparisons, I split countries in two samples and
pool countries’ observations within the sample. Motivated by the findings of the
importance of industrial rank correlations for the returns to skill in Section 3.3.1 I
segregate countries in above- and below-median rank correlations. I name the lower
group ”Club 0” and the higher ”Club 1”15. Given the high correlation of develop-
ment statistics and rank correlations in Table 3.3.1, henceforth I will also call them
the poor and rich clubs, respectively. Table 3.3.5 shows the equivalent regressions
for each country group. Again, the manufacturing and low-skilled industries exhibit
no correlation between average ranks and standard deviation of ranks in either club
and are therefore omitted. What is evident from the table is that high-skilled in-
dustries exhibit the familiar pattern of tighter matching (i.e. lower dispersion of
ranks) at higher average skills. Nonetheless, richer countries exhibit a much steeper
slope, suggestive of even stronger assortative forces at the top. Visual plots similar
to Figure 3.3.2 are presented in Appendix 3.B for each club and again confirm that
high-skilled industries have a similar consistent slope in both clubs, while low-skilled
ones show no or even reverse relation. Again, the dispersion of ranks seems to be
highest in the average-skilled industries suggestive of high cross-industry mismatch
as discussed above and further in Section 3.416. Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A shows
similar regressions while controlling for the dispersion of occupational types. There
for each occupation I compute the average skill in the full country club sample. Then
for each industry I compute the average type and dispersion of types of occupations
by their sample average skills. This allows us to see whether some industries hire
15Table 3.A.3 in Appendix 3.A shows the countries by club.
16There we also see that ranks dispersion is overall higher in the poorer club. This is a finding
to which we return in Section 3.4.2.
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more or less homogenously skilled occupations and if this is related to their average
type. The significance of the ranks mean-standard deviation relationship remains
intact in both specifications, confirming that the assortativeness pattern is a robust
feature beyond occupational specialisation and types.
Table 3.3.5: Mean rank by broad sectors and country clubs
Club 0 Club 1
all below median above median all below median above median
SD ranks -0.29 0.87∗ -1.28∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ 0.43 -1.65∗∗∗
(-0.85) (1.87) (-3.33) (-3.73) (0.92) (-5.12)
Number of occupations -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗
(-2.55) (-0.88) (-2.20) (-2.98) (-0.45) (-2.66)
Constant 0.69∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗
(7.17) (2.74) (8.36) (8.82) (2.42) (9.86)
Observations 55 30 25 59 32 27
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.094 0.336 0.211 -0.015 0.484
t statistics in parentheses
Note: Above and below median skill industries are defined according to the
median-skilled industry in the US.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
So far, we have established that higher-skilled industries tend to have workers of
more similar skill ranks from all occupation, which we interpret as stronger assor-
tativeness. Another intuitive measure of assortativeness is to compare the rankings
of two types of occupations within industries and see whether they follow a simi-
lar ranking. To this end I compute the average ranks of managers17 and those of
non-managers in a manner identical to before, and study their correlation. Perfect
PAM would be present if the correlation between the ranks of two groups of occupa-
tions across industries is equal to 1 and explains the entire variance. Naturally, and
as seen so far, the data is much richer and features search frictions which reduces
the explained variance. Importantly, comparisons across broad sectors (consisting
of above and below median industries, for example) is not valid here because any
cross-sectoral mismatch will result in steeper slopes (for instance, when a low rank
manager ends up in the above median sector). Table 3.3.6 shows the only valid
regressions of the full economy by country clubs. We see that rich countries have
17Managers consist of occupations of ISOC 2-digit scores of 11, 12, 13 and 14.
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stronger assortative matching shown by their higher R2 as well as steeper matching
functions which are closer to the theoretical PAM slope of 1. This corresponds to
lower mismatch regions for richer countries.
Table 3.3.6: Managerial rank to non-managerial rank, all industries
Club 0 Club 1





Adjusted R2 0.125 0.273
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
In summary, in this section we have established that industries differ in their
assortativeness. First, high-skilled industries tend to have very closely matched
workers by ranks from all occupations. Second, middle-skilled industries tend to
have highest dispersion of ranks which could be explained by higher cross-industry
mismatch due to labour frictions. At average skills workers are more likely to end
up in a over- or under-qualified industry than are workers at the ends of the skill
ranking. Moreover, we established that Club 1 countries have more assortative
matching of managers to non-manager workers. These are all features of the data
which will be studied in the theoretical model in the next section emphasising the
importance of returns to skill for the assortativeness of the matching within and
across industries.
3.4 Model
The model is an extension of the frictional 1-to-1 matching models (frictionless
- Becker (1973), and frictional - Eeckhout and Kircher (2011)) incorporating two
sectors to which heterogeneous workers sort according to their wage. A firm is a
team of one manager and one worker operating under the technology of one of the
sectors. The model is static, consisting of two stages. In the first stage, managers
and workers meet randomly to form a team. They can decide to stay together or
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pay a search cost and re-match to their optimal partner in the second stage. To
abstract from consumer preferences the model is kept in partial equilibrium where
the relative prices and productivities of the two sectors are taken as given18.
Workers have skill x ∈ [1, 2], while managers can have skills y above 2. Similar to
Sampson (2014) who assumes that firms choose their technology subject to a R&D
cost, I assume firms first employ their managers y subject to a sector-specific salary
and then look for workers x. Although at odds with the normalised ranks between
0 and 1 in the previous section, this approach brings the benefits of analytical
tractability as it allows us to solve analytically for the matching function x = µ(y).
An interpretation of this setup is to assume managers are much more mobile and
come from an exogenous world supply which is unaffected by any single country,
while workers are mostly a locally determined factor. The alternative approach
would be to also restrict the managers’ skill support between 1 and 2. Then the
matching function will depend on the assumed distributions of each type over the
support and there will be no analytical solution like in the model of Grossman et al.
(2017).
There is free entry of firms in either sector which in equilibrium ensures zero
profits for all firms. A firm in sector i hiring worker x and manager y pays them
respectively salaries wi(x) and zi(y). Working together the two produce fi(x, y) =
Ai(xy)
θi , where Ai is an industry productivity shifter. As aforementioned for analyt-
ical tractability the salary of the managers in a given industry is given exogenously
as zi(y) = piδiy
2θi , where the elasticity of the salary function was chosen to ensure
that the industrial matching function x = µi(y) is linear in y. The functional form
is motivated by the Mincerian equation which postulates that wages are log-linear
in skill. Lastly, pi is the price deflator for industry i. Given all of this the profits of
the firm are given as follows and due to free entry are equal to zero:
Πi(x, y) = pifi(x, y)− wi(x)− zi(y) = 0 (3.1)
piAi(xy)
θi − wi(x)− piδiy2θi = 0 (3.2)
18Note that Grossman et al. (2017) adopt a similar strategy.
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Note that the empirical equivalent to this object is the regression coefficient between
the rank of managers to non-managers’ rank in Table 3.3.6.
Using the zero profit condition, matching function and managers’ salary schedule
we can pin down the workers’ wage:
wi(x) = piAi(xy)
θi − piδiy2θi (3.4)
then plugging in for the matching function from (3.3) and the manager’s salary
zi(y) = piδiy








The model exhibits labour market frictions in terms of a search cost. Following
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) there are two stages of the matching. In the first stage
managers and workers meet randomly, then they can choose to stay together or pay
a search cost pic and match frictionlessly in the second stage which is described
as above. Thus, in the second period, once matched frictionlessly, a worker x will
certainly receive w∗i (x)− pic, while a manager y - zi(y)− pic . A match surplus in
the first stage is defined as:
pifi(x, y)− (w∗i (x)− pic)− (zi(y)− pic) (3.6)
Assuming that this match surplus is split by Nash bargaining with equal weights, a
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first-period match will be retained only if the net match surplus is positive
pifi(x, y)− (w∗i (x)− pic)− (zi(y)− pic) ≥ 0 (3.7)








x2θi − piδiy2θi ≥ −2cpi (3.9)
Consider for now that a pair chooses whether to stay together in industry i
or jump to stage 2 and match frictionlessly again in industry i. This scenario is
equivalent to the one considered in Eeckhout and Kircher (2011). Note, however,
that given the existence of only one sector and a fixed support for the skill of the
managers, the matching function in their model is always x = y. As discussed in
Section 3.3.2 the assortativeness and hence the matching functions differ across high-
and low-skilled sectors and later will define the two-sector equilibrium in our model.
This same-sector frictional matching problem presents a quadratic inequality in
(3.9) which has a solution with acceptance bands for partners. For a given worker























That is, a worker x would be willing to stay with a manager y in period 1 if and
only if y ∈ Bii(x). Notice that in the frictional case c = 0 the acceptance region











Thus, the existence of search costs results in deviations from perfect PAM with
moderate mismatch within a sector. Figure 3.4.1 illustrates the acceptance region
for θi = 1.25. Note that the matching bands are narrowing as x grows, resulting
in more assortative matching. If θi = 1, then the bands are linear and parallel to
the frictionless matching dotted line throughout, while the case of θi < 1 exhibits
widening acceptance region at higher x.
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Figure 3.4.1
























Acceptance matching bands of worker x for y partners
3.4.1 Two sectors
The empirical results in Section 3.3.1 show that the returns to skill are tightly
linked to the skill order of industries. Moreover, Section 3.3.2 illustrated that high-
skilled industries tend to have tighter matching bands and overall more assortative
matching of workers. To study the mechanisms connecting returns to skill, industrial
skill and assortativeness this section augments the model with two sectors. Taking
industrial output prices (pi) and productivities (Ai) as given workers and managers
endogenously choose to which sectors to sort, where sectors differ in their prices,
productivities and, importantly, returns to skill. Although rank correlations are not
well defined in a two-sector world, below we argue that cross-sectoral mismatch is a
proxy for industrial rank correlations as analysed in Section 3.3.1.
To ensure that both sectors exist, we will look for a Roy-type threshold equi-
librium in the frictionless case such that workers with skill x > x∗ sort to the
high-skilled sector, those with x < x∗ sort to the low-skilled sector and at x = x∗
workers are indifferent between working in either sector. To achieve this we need
the two wage schedules to have a single-crossing at a point x∗ > 1.
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Assumption 1. Call the high-skilled sector H and the low-skilled one L. Then let
θH > θL, so that the high-skilled has higher returns to skill.
Assumption 1 is consistent with our findings that the high-skilled sector has
higher returns to skill in Table 3.3.2. This higher elasticity of output with respect
to skills implies steeper wages in sector H than sector L and ensure a threshold

























Note that if θH = θL, then x
∗ is undetermined since the wage schedules are















The bands for matching pairs on either side of the cut-off are identical as in
the single-sector model in (3.10). However, with the introduction of two sectors
there could be cross-matching. In particular, a match in the first stage might be
between partners who in the second frictionless stage would end up being in different
industries and hence subject to different production technologies and wages. This
requires that additionally to solving for the same-sector matching bands we need
to compute bands for cross-matched pairs who prefer to stay cross-matched with
partners of the other sector than enter the second stage and search again.
I keep the convention that agent y as the manager determines the used technol-
ogy. If y > y∗, then the technology used will be of sector H, otherwise it will be of
sector L. Another convention is that the first letter in a matching pair type is for
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the worker (x) and the second for the manager (y), so a LH match is one between
a L worker (x < x∗) and a H manager (y > y∗).
Assumption 2. Managers determine the technology used in cross-sector mismatched
pairs.
Consider first the LH match case. The pair uses H technology due to the manager.
The condition for sustaining the first stage match is analogous to the derivation of
(3.7). That is, the net surplus of the first-stage match over the outside option of a
frictionless second-stage match must be positive in order to sustain the first-stage
matching. Here, however, in the second stage the worker will be sorted to sector L
and gets w∗L(x)− pLc, while the manager remains in sector H and gets zH(y)− pHc.








x2θL − c(pL + pH)
)
− pHδHy2θH ≥ 0 (3.18)
Notice that this inequality is quadratic in yθH but not in xθL for θH 6= θL, hence it
lacks an analytical solution for the acceptance bands of managers for their worker


















+ 4c(pL + pH)δHpH
) 1
θH
Similarly, the HL case requires positive net first-stage surplus to avoid re-matching.
Note that here the worker sorts to sector H in the frictionless case and gets w∗H(x)−
pHc, while the manager remains in sector L with net salary zL(y)− pLc.








x2θH − c(pL + pH)
)
− pLδLy2θL ≥ 0 (3.21)
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+ 4c(pL + pH)δLpL
) 1
θL
Again, as in the LH case the acceptance bands of manager y for worker partners x
lack an analytical solution.
In contrast to the same-sector match where the absence of search costs collapsed
the acceptance region to the frictionless matching function, here in the absence of
search costs the match should be suboptimal and not constitute an equilibrium.
Intuitively, since x and y are complements in production, the output of a pair is
maximized when assortatively matched19. Thus, if there were no search costs c = 0,
workers and managers can costlessly re-match optimally in a second stage which
guarantees them highest income. Thus, no member of a cross-matched pair optimally
chooses to remain cross-matched.
Proposition 2. In the absence of search costs (c = 0) no cross-matched pairs choose
to stay together and the two sectors are perfectly segregated with managers y > y∗
and workers x > x∗sorting to sector H, while those of lower skills sort to sector L.
That is, the two cross-matching outcomes LH and HL are suboptimal and do not
constitute an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider first the LH match case. By assumption the worker here will get
matched in the lower sector in the frictionless economy, so it must be that x < x∗








hence the parentheses in the square root of equation (3.19) are negative, violating
such a match.






> 1 and this time the parentheses in equation (3.22)
are negative, violating the match.
19This is a standard result in the positive assortative matching literature. See Becker (1973) and
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) among others.
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Therefore, if c = 0, neither of the LH or HL matches can be sustained and they
are always strictly dominated by the same-sector matches LL and HH.
3.4.2 Calibration and numerical solution
We can use the model to analyse how the level of matching assortativeness in different
countries is affected by differential returns to skill. In particular, not only can we
derive the width of the same-sector matching bands as in (3.10), but we can also
study the degree of cross-sectoral mismatch as defined by the cross-matching LH and
HL bands in (3.19) and (3.22), respectively. Tighter matching bands imply stronger
assortative matching since the skill of one of the partners has more explanatory power
for the skill of the other (see Table 3.3.6 for the empirical equivalent). A higher
level of cross-matching, on the other hand, implies less skill-segregation between
sectors and hence a lower average skill difference between the sectors. In a multi-
sector scenario this could change the ranking of sectors by average skills and hence
represents the rank correlation reversals identified in Section 3.3.1.
This section calibrates the model for the two country clubs and numerically
shows the same-sector and cross-sector matching bands. Since the search costs are
unobservable, they will be imputed from the data to match the level of mismatch
both within and across sectors in the two countries.
To simplify the calibration and focus on the role of returns to skill I assume that




= δ̄), while the search costs (cj) are country club specific.




= δ̄. Search costs are the same for H and L sectors in a given
country club.
Calibrating the model requires determining the values of 10 parameters per coun-
try club. Note that the choice of A and p is equivalent to a choice of units20 and what




for each country club j. Thus, I normalise AH0 = AH1, which implies δH0 = δH1 = δ̄.
20For instance, the search costs c would scale with A and p.
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Next, I normalise pH1 = pL1 = pH0 = 1 which leaves pL0 for calibration.
Buera et al. (2018) show a robust positive correlation between log GDP per
capita and the relative price of the high-skilled to low-skilled industries. Given the
normalisation of the relative prices of the two broad sectors to 1 in the rich club
of countries, using the average log GDP per capita for each club and the estimated
slope by Buera et al. (2018) yields a relative price of the high-skilled to low-skilled
sector in club 0 of pH0pL0 = 1.15⇒ pL0 = 1.15.
Turning to the calibration of the sorting cut-off x∗, note that it is a theoretical
object in the frictionless equilibrium and does not exist in the data which features
many occupations, search costs and other important worker characteristics beyond
numerical score. As discussed in Section 3.3.2 there is a lot of cross-sectoral mismatch
in the data which results in large overlap of numerical scores between sectors at
middle of the skill distribution. Table 3.4.1 summarises the distributions of average
occupational ranks across industries within broad sectors. The overlap of average
occupational ranks is much higher in Club 0 evident by the smaller difference in
average occupational ranks between the H and L sectors. Figures 3.B.3 and 3.B.4 in
Appendix 3.B plot the kernel densities by country club and sector to illustrate the
overlaps.
Table 3.4.1: Descriptive statistics - occupational ranks by sector
Club 0 Club 1
mean sd mean sd
L 0.47 0.11 0.41 0.10
H 0.56 0.13 0.60 0.14
Note: H and L sectors include industries
above and below the median-skilled in-
dustry in the US.
Since I define the high- and low-skilled sectors as above and below the median
skill, respectively, it is natural that the sorting cut-off for workers is x∗ = 1.5. I keep
this value for both country clubs.
The elasticity of the wage with respect to skill - 2θij from (3.5), is directly
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estimated through a Mincerian regression featuring interaction terms for all 4 com-
binations of country clubs (0 and 1) and broad sectors (H and L). The numerical
scores in the pooled sample were normalised to the interval [0, 1] for coherence with
the model’s worker skill support of length 1. Table 3.4.2 shows the base returns to
this normalised skill in club 0 sector L and the additional returns beyond it in other
sectors.





x 0 H 0.229∗∗∗
(0.0187)
x 1 L 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0177)





Standard errors in parentheses
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Regression includes personal controls as in (??), GDP per capita, rank
correlations and skill distributional controls and interaction terms. Occupa-
tional 2-digit FE are partialed out and weights are normalised so countries have
equal total weight of 1. Sectors H and L are aggregations of industries, respec-
tively above and below the US median-skilled industry.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The table implies that θL0 =
0.711
2 = 0.356, θH0 =
0.711+0.229
2 = 0.47, θL1 =
0.711+0.426
2 = 0.569 and θH1 =
0.711+0.503
2 = 0.607. The high-skilled sector features
higher returns to skill and the returns to skill in Club 1 are higher than those in
Club 0 in both sectors - both findings are consistent with the result from Table
3.3.2. Lastly, a notable feature of the data is the bigger difference between the
sectoral returns to skill in Club 0, which will help determine the overall search
costs in Club 0 below. This is again supported by Table 3.3.2 where higher rank
correlations translate to higher returns to skill more steeply in the low-skilled sector.
The only remaining structural parameters are AL0 and AL1 which we can obtain
from the wage indifference condition at x∗ from (3.13). Thus, in each country club
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where we have made use of Assumption 3
which implies ALδHAHδL = 1. Plugging in for the calibrated values implies AL0 = 0.954
and AL1 = 1.032. This calibration implies that the productivity of the low-skilled
sector has grown faster with GDP per capita from Club 0 to Club 1 than has the
productivity of the high-skilled sector. Note that this is consistent with the findings
of Buera et al. (2018) who show much faster TFP growth in the low skill-intensive
sector, which they attribute to technological advances in the goods industries.
Table 3.4.3 summarizes all calibrated and estimated values.
Table 3.4.3: Calibration
Club 0 Club 1 Source
AH 1 1 normalisation
AL 0.954 1.032 implied from wage crossing at x
∗
δH 0.45 0.45 assumed δ̄ = 0.45
δL 0.43 0.469 implied from AL and δ̄
θH 0.47 0.607 estimated in Table 3.4.2
θL 0.356 0.569 estimated in Table 3.4.2
pH 1 1 normalised
pL 1.15 1 Buera et al. (2018) for Club 0; normalised for Club 1
x∗ 1.5 1.5 by sectoral segregation at median skill
To calibrate the search cost c I will target the goodness of fit in the manager to
non-manager matching regressions in each country club from Table 3.3.6. The R-
squared imply the following ratios of unexplained relative variance (SSE to SST21):
SSE0
SST0
= 0.8584 and SSE1SST1 = 0.7141, which correspond to relative standard errors of
0.9265 and 0.8450. Thus, Club 0 has roughly 10% larger standard errors than Club
1. Tee 95% of the distribution of standard errors in Club 1 is 0.33. To back out the
implied search cost I target the radius of the within-sector matching bands at the
sectoral cut-off x∗ = 1.5 in the above median sector in Club 1 to be equal to the
21where SSE = Sum of Squared Errors; SST = Sum of Squared Total; R2 = 1− SSE
SST
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match acc. to matching function
Solving for c1 using the calibration in Table 3.4.3 yields c1 = 0.005. For Club 0 to
have 10% wider matching bands at x∗ in the above median sector it must be that
c0 = 0.00433.
Using the above calibration and search costs Figure 3.4.2 plots the acceptance
regions of worker x for manager partners y in country club 16. Below x∗ = 1.5 work-
ers sort to sector L because wL(x) > wH(x) and vice versa above x
∗. Nonetheless,
the dotted lines indicate that there are some workers around the threshold x∗ which
would accept a match with the opposite sector’s managers. These are precisely the
BLH(x) and BHL(x) cross-matching acceptance bands from (3.19) and (3.22).
Figure 3.4.2: Club 1:
Acceptance regions of worker w for a manager partner y
































Note also that the matching regions are slightly tighter in the high-skilled sector
due to its higher elasticity to skill (θH1 > θL1). This is consistent with our empirical
findings of the relationship between average ranks and the dispersion of ranks in
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Figure 3.3.2 and Table 3.3.5, as well as Table 3.3.4 where we saw that high-skilled
industries have much smaller dispersion of occupational skill ranks corresponding to
the width of the acceptance regions in the model.
Figure 3.4.3 shows the solution for Club 0 using the calibrated search cost of
c0 = 0.00433. Immediately, a few interesting results come up. First, as targeted for
the H sector, the matching bands of the both sectors are wider than in the richer
club, implying noisier within-sector matching. This lower assortativeness in Club 0
is due to its lower values of θ and is consistent with the lower R2 in the managerial
to non-managerial rank matching in Table 3.3.6. The difference in returns to skill
is strong enough that even if search costs are higher in the richer club (c1 > c0), the
assortativeness is still lower in the poor set of countries. Intuitively, the lower returns
to skill mean that agents have less to gain from paying the search cost and matching
optimally in the second stage. Thus, a wider region of the first-period matches
are sustained in equilibrium. Second, the acceptance regions for the L sector are
much wider than those of the H sector compared to the difference between the two
in Club 1. This bears the same explanation and is due to the higher difference
θH0 − θL0 > θH1 − θL1, that is - workers in sector L in Club 0 are least picky about
their partners as they have very little to gain from matching optimally in the second
stage.
Interestingly, the cross-matching regions (BLH(x) and BHL(x)) appear smaller in
Club 0 than Club 1. This is due again to the larger gap in returns to skill in Club 0.
In particular, the returns to skill in Club 1 are very comparable between the sectors
so cross-matched pairs face a relatively small gain from re-matching to their optimal
sector. In Club 0, however, the difference in returns to skill is more pronounced and,
for instance, H managers would require too high compensation from L workers in a
cross-matched pair such that the workers would prefer to re-match .
Nonetheless, remember that earlier in Table 3.4.1 and the companion kernel
densities (3.B.3 and 3.B.4 in Appendix 3.B ) we showed that the data suggests
higher cross-sectoral mismatch in Club 0. Moreover, as argued in Section 3.3.1
lower rank correlations may be interpreted as a result of larger cross-mismatch and
by the definition of our country clubs based on rank correlations, it is expected
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that Club 0 should have higher cross-mismatch. To explain the larger observed
cross-mismatch, it must be that Club 0 has stronger labour frictions. Intuitively,
the higher frictions counteract the high difference in returns to skill in Club 0. In
particular, cross-mismatched workers have a stronger incentive to re-match in Club
0 as discussed above. However, if the search costs are much higher as well, this
will dampen the gains from re-matching caused by high returns to skill difference
and in equilibrium there will be more cross-matching. Increasing the search cost
c0, however, would augment not only the cross-matching bands but also the within
sector ones. The latter were calibrated as 10% wider in the H sector than in Club 1
and any higher costs would violate this empirical finding.
Figure 3.4.3: Club 0:
Acceptance regions of worker w for a manager partner y



























What this numerical exercise shows us is that higher returns to skill in rich
countries contribute to tighter matching bands and hence more assortative matching
in both broad sectors. Nonetheless, the returns to skill difference between the two
sectors is lower in richer countries which facilitates more cross-sectoral mismatch
as workers and managers have less to gain from matching to their theoretically
optimal sector. To explain the higher level of mismatch found in the PIAAC dataset
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for poorer countries, it must be that poorer countries have higher and perhaps
additional labour market frictions to rich ones.
Overall, the model matches well the overall within- and cross-sector mismatch
in rich countries. It also illustrates how lower returns to skill in poorer countries
contribute to higher mismatch for any given search costs. Importantly, the model
illustrates a novel trade-off for assortativeness in multi-sector models. Namely, the
development of countries is associated not only with higher returns to skill but also
lower differences in these returns across sectors. The improvement in returns to skill
leads to lower overall mismatch both across and within sectors. The convergence
of returns across sectors, however, leads to higher cross-sectoral mismatch which
counteracts the allocative gains from overall higher returns to skill. Despite bearing
merit in accounting for the empirical matching bands, the calibrated model is at
odds with the data by predicting that richer countries have higher cross-sectoral
mismatch. Accounting for this trade-off stands as an important area for future
research with potential explanations relating to differential search costs by sectors
not only countries and introducing additional types of labour market frictions (say,
retraining costs of changing sectors).
3.5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the relationship between returns to skill and assortative matching.
It first shows evidence from the novel PIAAC dataset of workers’ cognitive scores
that returns to skill are closely related to industrial progress towards the frontier in
OECD countries. It then establishes that high-skilled industries exhibit strongest
assortative forces in all countries by developing a novel empirical measure. A major
contribution of the paper is the study of assortativeness across countries. It finds that
richer countries have stronger assortative forces and less cross-sectoral mismatch.
This is attributed to the higher estimated returns to skill in richer countries and the
mechanism is illustrated through a matching model.
The model builds on the frictional 1-to-1 matching model of Eeckhout and
Kircher (2011) and incorporates two sectors to which workers can sort. Due to
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the presence of search costs randomly matched team members might choose to stay
together even if a second-stage match would sort them optimally. The degree of
sectoral cross-match is shown to be decreasing in the difference of returns to skill
between the two sectors. Intuitively, if workers have a lot to gain by moving to the
correct sector, they are more likely to re-match. Interestingly, rich countries are
found to have lower within sectoral matching bands, but larger cross-sectoral mis-
match for a given search cost. This is caused by the overall higher returns to skill in
rich countries but also smaller differences between sectors. To explain the uncovered
higher cross-mismatch in poorer countries in the data, the model implies that poor
countries must exhibit higher and perhaps additional types of labour frictions than
rich ones. Studying the source of higher labour frictions in poorer countries stands
as an important area for future research. Potential explanations might include dif-
ferential search costs by sector not only country and explicit retraining costs for
workers when changing sectors.
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Appendix
3.A Tables
Table 3.A.1: Mean rank by broad sectors and country clubs - occupational type
controls
Club 0
H above median below median
SD occupational scores -0.279 -0.443 -0.508
(-0.80) (-1.59) (-1.49)
SD ranks -1.305∗∗ -0.886∗∗ 0.395
(-4.17) (-3.32) (1.38)
Constant 0.934∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(9.15) (10.20) (4.15)
Observations 16 28 30
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.396 0.043
Club 1
H above median below median
SD occupational scores -0.73∗ -0.69∗∗ -0.20
(-1.80) (-2.63) (-0.83)
SD ranks -2.08∗∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗ 0.42
(-4.17) (-4.27) (1.13)
Constant 1.24∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(7.00) (11.27) (2.55)
Observations 17 29 29
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.537 0.019
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 106
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Table 3.A.2: Occupational Rank correlations
a b c d e
Returns to skill 0.12∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.10 0.15∗









Observations 25 25 25 23 25
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.155 0.139 0.121 0.082
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: Lgdppc, Lckpc and Lhc refer to log deviations of GDP per capita, capital
per capita and human capital relative to the US as measured by the Penn World
Table. Mean VApc is the average value added per capita of at 4-digit industries
from the UNIDO’s INDSTAT4 dataset. To control for countries’ different skill
ditributions all regressions partial out the 90-th to 10-th percentile skill in each
country. The US is not included in regressions with rank correlations because
its rank correlation is trivially 1.
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Table 3.A.3: Country clubs - above and below median industrial rank correlation
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3.B Figures

















Note: Above and Below median are groups of industries which are respectively
 above and below the median average occupational skill rank in the pooled sample.

















Note: Above and Below median are groups of industries which are respectively
 above and below the median average occupational skill rank in the pooled sample.
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Note: Above and Below median are groups of industries which are respectively
 above and below the median average occupational skill rank in the US.


















Note: Above and Below median are groups of industries which are respectively
 above and below the median average occupational skill rank in the US.
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3.C Data
The PIAAC dataset provides final weights for each individual which are meant to
correct national ”sample data for bias resulting from survey errors such as sampling
error, nonresponse error or noncoverage error” (Perry et al., 2017). These weights
are required for an unbiased estimation on a national level. When pooling countries
together I normalise the individual final weight such that each country has a cumu-
lative weight of 1 (see Hanushek et al. (2015)). The PIAAC final weights, however,
are not appropriate in weighting occupation-industry cells against each other since
the weights are calculated on individual demographic and geographic characteris-
tics vis-à-vis the national, and not on individual professional characteristics such as
occupation or industry. In these cases I assign equal weight to every worker in the
occupation-industry-country cell. Occupations in an industry are then weighted by
their number of workers.
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386.
Kremer, M. and Maskin, E. (1996). Wage inequality and segregation by skill. Tech-
nical report, National bureau of economic research.
McGowan, M. A. and Andrews, D. (2015). Labour market mismatch and labour
productivity.
Ohnsorge, F. and Trefler, D. (2007). Sorting it out: International trade with het-
erogeneous workers. Journal of political Economy, 115(5):868–892.
Pellizzari, M. and Fichen, A. (2017). A new measure of skill mismatch: theory and
evidence from piaac. IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 6(1):1.
Perry, A., Helmschrott, S., Konradt, I., and Maehler, D. B. (2017). User guide for
the german piaac scientific use file.
Sampson, T. (2014). Selection into trade and wage inequality. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 6(3):157–202.
Sampson, T. (2016). Assignment reversals: Trade, skill allocation and wage inequal-
ity. Journal of Economic Theory, 163:365–409.
114
